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I. INTRODUCTION
When a corporation sells substantially all its assets to another
corporation, the transferor corporation often will dissolve after dis-
tributing to its creditors and shareholders the consideration it re-
ceived in the transfer. The process by which the transferor corpora-
tion pays its creditors and distributes its remaining assets to its
shareholders is called liquidation. Although liquidation theoreti-
cally should settle all claims against the dissolved corporation, I cer-
tain "contingent" claims often do not appear until after liquida-
tion.2 These claims 3 frequently are asserted against the dissolved
1. See, e.g., Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927) ("It is well settled
that at common law ... the result of dissolution can not be distinguished from the death of
a natural person in its effect."); Fleming v. Charles L. Harney Constr. Co., 177 F.2d 65 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 893 (1949); Imperial Film Exch. v. General Film Co., 244 F. Supp.
985 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); MacRae v. Kansas City Piano Co., 69 Kan. 457, 77 P. 94 (1904). On
liquidation generally, see W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
7968 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
2. For a discussion of when products liability claims arise, see Note, Statutes of Limita-
tions: Their Selection and Application in Products Liability Cases, 23 VAND. L. REv. 775
(1970). For a definition of "contingent" claims, see text accompanying note 22 infra.
3. Compare Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (suit against
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transferor corporation, its shareholders, and its directors, as well as
against the transferee corporation.'
This Article initially will explore the nature and extent of
shareholders' and directors' liabilities for contingent claims against
the dissolved corporation by examining section 105 of the Model
Business Corporation Act and the case law5 of those states that have
adopted the Model Act.' Two purposes underlying the Model Act
are uniformity and progressive resolution of issues inadequately re-
solved by the common law or earlier statutes.7 An exhaustive analy-
sis of the case law under section 105 of the Model Act, however,
reveals that both purposes have been frustrated, if not defeated.
First, uniformity among jurisdictions, as well as within each Model
Act state, is defeated by the overwhelming inconsistency in the case
law. Litigants presently can choose precedent to support almost any
position they seek to argue. Moreover, section 105 itself does not
resolve clearly any of the major post-dissolution liability issues. Its
ambiguous language has furnished litigants and courts with little
guidance in determining the legislatively intended answers to key
issues.
This examination of contingent claims against a dissolved cor-
poration, its shareholders, and its directors has two objectives: (1)
to describe the cases addressing these claims and their underlying
policy problems, and (2) to propose legislative action for unifying
judicial treatment of defendants faced with contingent claims. The
cases also are analyzed to determine policies that underlie the deci-
sion whether to impose post-dissolution liability. An understanding
of these policies will clarify court decisions that on their face remain
inconsistent. In practice, the policy approach to resolution of issues
has been undermined by courts that have been all too ready to use
any available rule that would achieve a desired outcome. Although
attempts are made to harmonize some of the cases, the reader
should remain aware of the patently inconsistent case law because
this precedent will remain the primary source of law unless legisla-
tive revisions such as those urged in the final section of this Article
are adopted.
transferee corporation) with Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 325, 190 N.W.2d 521 (1971)
(suit against dissolved manufacturing corporation).
4. For a discussion of causes of action asserted against transferee corporations, see 30
VAND. L. Rav. 238 (1977).
5. The current law for purposes of this Article is the case law of those states that have
adopted substantially all of section 105 of the Model Business Corporation Act. See generally
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2d § 105 (1971 & Supp. 1977).
6. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 105 [hereinafter cited as MODEL Acr].
7. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2d § 1, 2 (1971).
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II. BACKGROUND: SECTION 105 AND THE TRUST FUND THEORY
Section 105 of the Model Act is a "survival" statute, so named
because it provides for the survival of remedies against dissolved
corporations. The survival statute was drafted primarily to abolish
the common law rule that all actions by or against a corporation
abate upon dissolution of the corporation." For present purposes, the
following language of section 105 is central:
The dissolution of a corporation ... shall not take away or impair any
remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors, officers, or share-
holders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such
dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced within two
years after the date of such dissolution.'
Claims brought pursuant to this provision raise two primary issues:
(1) did the claimant's right or claim exist prior to dissolution, and
(2) did the claimant commence his action within two years following
the date of dissolution? These issues are discussed in detail below.
Section 105, however, may not be the sole basis upon which a
claimant may recover upon a claim against a dissolved corporation.
The common law "trust fund" theory may provide an alternative
basis for the contingent claimant, although the courts are confused
about the continued vitality of the trust fund theory. 0 If, in addition
8. See, e.g., Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927) ("[D]issolution
of a corporation at common law abates all litigation in which the corporation is appearing
either as plaintiff or defendant."); Beasley v. Fox, 173 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1949); W.
FLErCHER, supra note 1, § 8173.
9. MODEL Acr, supra note 6, § 105. Officers incur liability statutorily. The trust fund
theory developed in equity creates only directors' and shareholders' liabilities. Nevertheless,
statutes may consider both officers and directors to be trustees for distribution of the corpo-
rate assets. Because this Article is concerned primarily with trust fund theory liabilities,
director and shareholder liability will be discussed more than officer liability. The Illinois
survival statute acknowledges the absence of officers' liability following dissolution by omit-
ting officers from the continuation provisions of the survival statute. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
32, § 157.94 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
10. See, e.g., Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability
Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 865, 894, 896 (1971) ("Corporate statutes have supplemented but
not necessarily replaced the 'trust fund theory' - . . ." ) ("IThe statutory application to
post-dissolution claims is so tenuous as to make it more probable that common law and
equitable principles apply. .. ").
Actions based upon theories of fraudulent conveyances also have been brought against
recipient shareholders. See, e.g., Menconi v. Davison, 80 Ill. App. 2d 1,225 N.E.2d 139 (1967).
In Menconi, however, the court did not mention that the distributing corporation had dis-
solved but instead referred only to the liquidation of the corporation. Whether the court failed
to mention dissolution to skirt a potential conflict with the Illinois survival statute, or
whether the corporation actually had never dissolved, is an unanswered question. In at least
one case in which judgment was obtained before dissolution, a court held that expiration of
the two-year survival period did not bar an equitable action to discover assets of a corporate
judgment debtor in the hands of the fraudulent transferee shareholders. La Cross Mfg. Co.
v. Springer, 323 111. App. 525, 56 N.E.2d 146 (1944) (abstract only published). For authority
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to postponing the common law rule of abatement, section 105 has
extinguished the trust fund theory, then the two issues phrased
above would define the limits of directors' and shareholders' liabili-
ties upon claims that could have been maintained against only the
dissolved corporation but for its dissolution. Because much of this
Article discusses the relationship between section 105 and the trust
fund theory, it is necessary to explore the trust fund theory.
The purpose of the trust fund theory is the. same as that of
section 105-to relieve creditors of the hardship caused by the com-
mon law abatement of actions and claims against a dissolved corpo-
ration. The trust fund theory developed in equity to allow recovery
against the distributed assets of a dissolved corporation. Those as-
sets become a "trust fund against which the corporate creditors
have a . . . claim"" prior to that of the shareholders or any trans-
feree who is not a bona fide purchaser.'2 If a creditor obtains a
judgment against a corporation before the corporation dissolves,
execution will issue against the assets in the hands of any share-
holder.' 3 If a creditor fails to obtain a judgment before dissolution
of a corporation and consequently loses his cause of action through
abatement, then the creditor can bring the claim against a recipient
shareholder individually or against that shareholder's transferee, if
not a bona fide purchaser, for the distributed assets then in the
possession of the shareholder or transferee.'4 Receipt of the distrib-
that improper distributions to shareholders should be attacked through the applicable corpo-
rate statutes, rather than be treated as fraudulent conveyances, see 2 G. GLxw, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PRaEmINCES § 604 (rev. ed. 1940). For a discussion of the availability of
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act as a means for contingent tort claimants to recover
against recipient shareholders, see Henn & Alexander, supra, at 896 n.173.
11. W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 8161, at 371 (footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 371-72; Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors upon
Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30
Bus. LAW. 1061, 1072-73 (1975); see King v. Coosa Valley Mineral Prod. Co., 283 Ala. 197,
203, 215 So. 2d 275, 280 (1968) (quoting Kelly v. Andalusia Brick Co., 222 Ala. 203, 131 So.
559 (1930)); Luedecke v. Des Moines Cabinet Co., 140 Iowa 223, 118 N.W. 456 (1908); Love
v. Garner, 64 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933) ("[The right of a creditor to pursue the
property of the corporation into the hands of the only stockholder and his assignees with
notice is well settled."); White v. Texas Motor Car & Supply Co., 228 S.W. 138 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1921).
13. W. FLErcHER, supra note 1, § 8161, at 370. In the alternative, the creditor could sue
on the judgment against an individual shareholder. Id.; see, e.g., World Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Bass, 160 Tex. 261, 328 S.W.2d 863 (1959); cf. King v. Coosa Valley Mineral Prod.
Co., 283 Ala. 197, 204, 215 So. 2d 275, 280 (1968) (the dissolved corporation's shareholders
"were represented by the corporation, so far as to render binding on them the judgment in
respect to corporate matters and their interests in the corporation").
14. Updike v. United States, 8 F.2d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 661
(1926) ("where the debt was not judicially established by action against the corporation
before its dissolution, it may be presented and its validity determined in the equitable suit
to enforce such liability of the stockholders"); Myers v. Shapiro Bros. Factors Corp., 154
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uted assets creates no personal liability for a shareholder unless the
shareholder "has disposed of the trust fund in such a manner that
it cannot be followed or where he has caused a diminution in the
value of the trust assets."'"
The trust fund theory applies differently to directors of the
dissolved corporation.'" Since shareholders are not trustees, they
have no fiduciary duties and, as noted above, they are not person-
ally liable except in special circumstances. Under the trust fund
theory, shareholder liability arises because the shareholders possess
the distributed assets to which an equitable lien has attached.'7 The
liability of distributing directors for claims against the dissolved
corporation arises because they are trustees for creditors and share-
holders in settling the dissolved corporation's affairs.'8 Thus, direc-
tor liability is personal and exists even though the director no longer
possesses any of the dissolved corporation's assets.'9 The liability
arises, however, only if there is a breach of the fiduciary duties owed
to creditors and shareholders while the director is acting in his ca-
pacity as trustee. 0
The primary fiduciary duty directors owe to creditors is to make
adequate provision for payment of creditors' claims against the dis-
solved corporation. If directors perform this duty, they are not liable
to their dissolved corporation's creditors. Since this Article is con-
cerned with contingent liabilities, the determinative question is
whether the distributing directors made adequate provision for pay-
S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Ct. App. 1941); see W. FLrCHR, supra note 1, § 8161; Norton, supra note
12, at 1074-76.
15. Koch v. United States, 138 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1943); see W. FLETCHER, supra
note 1, § 8161, at 372; Norton, supra note 12, at 1073-74.
16. Use of the term "trust fund" theory to describe the liability of distributing directors
has been questioned. See Henn & Alexander, supra note 10, at 880 n.79. The term, however,
is descriptive and has been used to refer to theories of directors' as well as shareholders'
liabilities. See id. at 892, 907.
17. Norton, supra note 12, at 1070-72.
18. W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 8175, 8186; see, e.g., Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co.,
98 Idaho 266, 280, 561 P.2d 1299, 1313 (1977). See generally Evons v. Winkler, 388 S.W.2d
265 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965).
19. See, e.g., White v. Texas Motor Car & Supply Co., 228 S.W. 138 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1921); Wortham v. Lachman-Rose Co., 440 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); Pine
Manor Homes, Inc. v. Duval, 76 Mont. Co. L. Rep. 296, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 451 (1959), discussed
in Henn & Alexander, supra note 10, at 907 n.214. See generally King v. Coosa Valley Mineral
Prod. Co., 283 Ala. 197, 202, 215 So.2d 275, 279 (1968) ("A dissolved corporation's directors
are jointly and severally liable to the corporation's creditors and stockholders to the extent
of the corporate property coming into the hands of the directors.").
20. See King v. Coosa Valley Mineral Prod. Co., 283 Ala. 197, 202, 215 So.2d 275, 279
(1968) ("directors must exercise the reasonable care and prudence as that ordinarily required
of trustees, in the performance of their duties as statutory trustees"); W. FLg'CHER, supra
note 1, § 8186; Henn & Alexander, supra note 10, at 892-93, 906-07.
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ment of the contingent claims. Adequate provision for contingent
claims "goes no further than to require the directors to refrain from
distributing so much of the available corporate assets as may be
required to satisfy such [contingent] obligations as and when they
mature."
21
A contingent claim or liability has been defined as "one which
has not accrued and which is dependent on the happening of some
future event .. .which may or may not happen. ' 2  Among these
claims are tort claims that arise after dissolution.2 For example, a
products liability claim against a dissolved manufacturing corpora-
tion based upon strict liability in tort arises at the time the defective
product injures the claimant. 24 This injury may occur several years
after dissolution. Or, for example, negligent hospital employees may
leave a foreign object inside a patient. The patient's claim arises
upon discovery of the object in his body.2 The discovery may be
made several years following dissolution of the corporation that
owned the hospital at the time the negligence took place. The relief
afforded by the trust fund theory as applied to both directors and
shareholders of the dissolved corporation apparently is available to
claimants with such contingent claims against the dissolved corpo-
ration. 2 Although few cases have discussed the availability of the
trust fund theory to claimants with post-dissolution claims,2 the
trust fund theory both by its nature and by its purpose should allow
claimants with contingent claims to recover when those claims fi-
nally arise.
21. W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 8186, at 436 (footnote omitted); see New Jersey Title
Guar. & Trust Co. v. Berliner, 136 N.J. Eq. 162, 40 A.2d 790 (1945); Heaney v. Riddle, 343
Pa. 453, 456, 23 A.2d 456, 458 (1942) ("IT]he corporation could not dissolve and distribute
its assets among the stockholders without its liquidating trustees retaining sufficient assets
to provide for the corporate debts, including contingent claims . . . . [W]hen defendants,
as liquidating trustees, distributed the assets among themselves as stockholders they made
themselves personally liable, by reason of such breach of their trust . ). But see Henn
& Alexander, supra note 10, at 907 & n.214.
22. In re Lexington Sur. & Indem. Co., 272 N.Y. 210, 214, 5 N.E.2d 204, 205 (1936)
(quoting 13 C.J. Contingent Claims § 114 (1917)).
23. See Note, supra note 2. If the claims are brought upon a theory of breach of war-
ranty, rather than upon a tort theory, the claims will be deemed to arise at the time of sale
rather than at the time of injury. For a discussion of the possible effect of the distinction
between causes of action based upon tort claims, which do not exist "prior to. . .dissolution"
and causes of action based upon breach of warranty claims, which arise "prior to. . .dissolu-
tion," see Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a
Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV.
321, 327 (1976).
24. See Note, supra note 2, at 787-88.
25. See generally 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 60 (1951).
26. See Henn & Alexander, supra note 10, at 894 nn.161-62, 909; Wallach, supra note
23, at 331.
27. See Norton, supra note 12, at 1074-76.
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Ill. EXCLUSIVENESS OF SECTION 105
Section 105 creates no new cause of action." The statute merely
continues in existence "any remedy available to or against such
[dissolved] corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders."'"
The continuation applies, however, only to claims existing or liabili-
ties incurred prior to dissolution, and the continuation lasts only for
a definite period of time-two years following dissolution." The first
subsection below addresses the question whether section 105's ex-
press continuation of claims existing prior to dissolution has the
effect of barring post-dissolution claims. The intention of the draft-
ers of the Model Act is unclear, and arguments can be made both
pro and con.' The second subsection below presents the question
whether section 105's express continuation of remedies against the
shareholders and directors for a definite period was intended to bar
after expiration of that continuation period the maintenance of any
cause of action against shareholders and directors for claims that
would have been brought against their corporation but for its disso-
lution.
A. Does Section 105 Prohibit Post-Dissolution Claims?
Section 105 provides in part that the dissolution of a corpora-
tion shall not impair any remedy against that corporation, its share-
holders, or its directors, "for any right or claim existing, or any
liability incurred, prior to such dissolution. 3 2 The quoted language
is important to a determination of section 105's effect upon contin-
gent claims, since by its own terms section 105 applies only to pre-
dissolution claims. Thus, the type of contingent tort claims dis-
cussed in the final paragraph of Part II of this Article do not fall
within the express language of section 105. 11 Courts have assessed
28. See, e.g., Walden Home Builders, Inc. v. Schmit, 326 Ill. App. 386, 62 N.E.2d 11
(1945).
29. MODEL Acr, supra note 6, § 105.
30. Several states have substituted survival periods of three years or more for the two-
year period of the Model Act provision. See, e.g., Tax. Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon
1956) (three years). In at least one state the dissolved corporation is continued indefinitely.
Amuz. Rav. STAT. § 10-105 (1977). For a somewhat dated list of the length of survival periods,
see MODEL Bus. CORP. Ac. ANN. 2d § 105, 3.03(2) (1971).
31. See Wallach, supra note 23, at 327-35.
32. MODEL AcT, supra note 6, § 105.
33. An argument can be made that although for purposes of the running of the statute
of limitations a claim may arise when a hospital patient discovers the foreign object, for
purposes of categorizing the claim as a predissolution claim or a post-dissolution claim within
the section 105 framework, the claim should arise when the negligence or the injury occurred.
The argument has merit, both in this context and in the context of products liability claims
that arguably arise when the defect occurs rather than when the injury occurs. No case
1370 [Vol. 31:1363
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the effect of section 105 upon post-dissolution claims in four ways.
The first two assessments are based upon interpretations of the
language of section 105. First, the drafters may have intended to
limit the application of section 105 to claims arising prior to dissolu-
tion in an effort to except post-dissolution claims from the bar im-
posed when the two-year survival period expires. Under this read-
ing, post-dissolution claims could be maintained at any time-even
after the survival period expires." Second, the drafters may have
intended to limit the application of section 105 to claims arising
prior to dissolution in an effort to extend the existence of predissolu-
tion claims, while barring post-dissolution claims altogether.3 5
The third assessment, on the other hand, ignores the language
of section 105 that distinguishes predissolution claims from those
arising upon or after dissolution. Under this assessment, post-
dissolution claims, just like predissolution claims, could be main-
tained during the two-year survival period but would be barred
thereafter. Finally, the fourth assessment completely ignores the
language of section 105 and would allow post-dissolution claims
against former shareholders and directors at any time. This assess-
ment, however, is based not upon an interpretation of the language
of section 105, but rather upon a postulated nonapplication of sec-
tion 105 to certain types of claims-claims that did not abate at
common law.
(1) Post-Dissolution Claims Allowed Any Time:
A Statutory Interpretation
In Levy v. Liebling3' the Seventh Circuit allowed shareholders
to bring a cause of action more than two years after dissolution by
interpreting the "prior to. . . dissolution" language to except post-
dissolution claims from the statutory bar. Sixteen years after disso-
lution of their corporation, the former shareholders filed suit to
recover the amount remaining unpaid upon a judgment the corpora-
tion obtained prior to its dissolution. Defendant argued that the suit
was barred by the two-year limitation on the survival of remedies.
addressing the issue has been found. But cf. George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964) (court interpreted statutory language "where the cause
of action arose" to have a meaning other than that usually assigned to the phrase in order to
effect a particular purpose of the statute in question).
34. See Henn & Alexander, supra note 10, at 908 n.220, 909 & n.222; Wallach, supra
note 23, at 327 n.24.
35. See Henn & Alexander, supra note 10, at 899.
36. 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957), discussed in 23 Mo.
L. REv. 82 (1958). For further discussion of Levy, see Schoone, Shareholder Liability upon
Voluntary Dissolution of Corporation, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 415, 425-26 (1961).
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The court answered defendant's argument in the following manner:
[The survival statute] by its express language applies to "any right or claim
existing, or any liability incurred prior to such dissolution." It is obvious that
the right or claim of Imperial [the dissolved corporation] in the Chicago
judgment against defendant existed prior to the time of its dissolution, but it
is equally obvious that the right or claim of plaintiffs in suit was not in exist-
ence prior to that time.Y
The court's reasoning assumes that the survival statute barred,
after a two-year survival period, claims that existed prior to dissolu-
tion but that it did not bar post-dissolution claims. Applying that
assumption, the court held that the former shareholders could
maintain their claim because it was a claim which they acquired not
before dissolution of the corporation, but upon dissolution. 8
The Levy court's reason for holding as it did is that to hold
otherwise would have led to "the anomalous result of creating a bar
to the capacity of the stockholders to sue at the same time they
acquired title to and became vested with the ownership of the judg-
ment. '39 This reason has far more weight for post-dissolution claims
available against the dissolved corporation's former shareholders
than for claims available to the dissolved corporation's former
37. 238 F.2d at 507.
38. Under Levy, former shareholders have post-dissolution claims if their claims are
brought in the shareholders' individual capacities rather than in their corporate capacities
on behalf of the corporation. The Levy court distinguished certain cases argued by defendant
on the following ground:
[T]his action was not brought by plaintiffs in their capacity as former stockholders of
Imperial [the dissolved corporation], as defendant ...states. The suit was brought
in their individual capacity, and their status as former stockholders is immaterial other
than to show the manner by which they acquired a right sufficient to authorize the
maintenance of a suit.
Defendant in his reply brief. . .concedes that plaintiffs could maintain the instant
action if they had acquired a vested right by reason of an assignment made by Imperial
during the two-year period. . ..
238 F.2d at 508. According to the court, defendant conceded that an assignment of the cause
of action during the two-year period after dissolution would give rise to a post-dissolution
claim. The Levy court saw no reason to distinguish this assignment from a distribution to
the shareholders that occurred only "upon" dissolution. Id. at 506. This analysis has the
peculiar effect of classifying claims brought by former shareholders in their individual capaci-
ties as post-dissolution claims while classifying claims brought by shareholders in their corpo-
rate capacities as predissolution claims. For further discussion of the distinction between
actions against shareholders and directors individually and actions against them in their
capacities as shareholders and directors, see text accompanying notes 89-103 infra.
39. 238 F.2d at 507. At least one student author found nothing objectionable about
giving the shareholders "a right which they could not from the beginning enforce." Id. In fact,
the author criticized the Levy court for failing to recognize that, if the ability of the dissolved
corporation to enforce the judgment had expired under the survival statute, then the dis-
solved corporation had only a judgment right with no remedy to distribute to its shareholders.
The recipient shareholders should have been entitled only to what the corporation had to
distribute-an unenforceable judgment right. 23 Mo. L. Rav. 82, 84 (1958).
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shareholders. Claims available to the former shareholders, as in
Levy, could have been enforced during the survival period by the
dissolved corporation, and if the corporation refused to file suit, the
stockholders could have initiated derivative actions to enforce the
outstanding claims.4" These claims actually are predissolution
claims available to the corporation; the need to characterize them
as post-dissolution claims in the hands of former shareholders and
to hold them not barred by the survival statute is less clear than the
need to protect claimants' rights against the corporation and its
shareholders when the claimants' causes of action first arise after
the two-year survival period.
Levy purported to interpret the Kentucky survival statute,
which the court conceded should have the same interpretation as
the Illinois survival statute.4' Illinois law on the subject was re-
viewed at length by a federal court in Gordon v. Loew's Inc.,4" which
was decided two weeks after Levy. In Gordon, the former sharehold-
ers of a dissolved motion picture theater corporation brought treble
damage actions under the Clayton Act. Defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the shareholders brought the
actions after the survival period expired. The shareholders argued
that the survival statute failed to bar their claims because the
claims had passed to the shareholders individually by operation of
law upon dissolution or, in the alternative, by assignment before
dissolution. The Gordon court, unlike the court in Levy, found the
claims of the shareholders to be predissolution rather than post-
dissolution claims.
Answering the question whether the transfer of the claims by
operation of law created post-dissolution claims, the court stated
that "each of the theater corporations . . . had, before its dissolu-
tion, a remedy against the defendants under Section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act, which remedy persisted for two years after dissolution of
the corporation, but is no longer available either to the corporation
or to its shareholders, the present plaintiffs. 4 3 As to whether the
assignment created post-dissolution claims, the court stated that
"[w]here a cause of action is assigned by a corporation to its sole
stockholders on the effective date of dissolution, . . . such cause of
action is surely for a 'remedy available to. . . such corporation...
prior to such dissolution' within the meaning of Sec. 94 [the Illinois
40. Id.
41. 238 F.2d at 506.
42. 147 F. Supp. 398 (D.N.J. 1956), aff'd, 247 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1957).
43. Id. at 407.
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survival statute].,"" No case has followed the stated holding in Levy
that former shareholders have post-dissolution claims as to any
property right distributed to them upon dissolution, 5 but Gordon
has been followed by cases interpreting the laws of Illinois" and
Wisconsin, 7 the two states with the most fully developed case law
under the Model Act formulation of the survival statute. Although
the holding in Gordon directly contradicts the stated holding in
Levy, it fails to undercut the Levy assumption that post-dissolution
claims are excepted from the bar imposed by expiration of the sec-
tion 105 two-year survival period. The result in Gordon, as in Levy,
is determined by the characterization of the claims in question as
post-dissolution or predissolution claims. The cases are inconsistent
only because they characterize differently the claims at issue. Thus,
nothing in Gordon requires that post-dissolution claims be barred
by the survival statute either before or after the survival period
expires."
The Levy assumption-that post-dissolution claims are main-
tainable before and after the survival period expires-has merit
primarily because it encourages dissolving corporations to take
steps to provide for contingent claims. 9 When a corporation sells
substantially all its assets, the purchaser typically will assume the
known liabilities of the selling corporation. Any known liabilities
that remain unassumed will be satisfied during liquidation. Contin-
gent liabilities that first arise following dissolution, however, remain
both unassumed and unsatisfied. The purchaser corporation may be
held liable for post-dissolution products liability claims, but pur-
chaser liability is restricted to narrow factual situations.0 If the
survival statute is interpreted to bar all post-dissolution claims,
then no incentive remains to encourage dissolving corporations to
take steps to protect claimants whose claims arise upon or after
dissolution.5' The dissolving corporation has no incentive to negoti-
44. Id. at 407-08.
45. A similar result, however, was reached in a case that preceded Levy. Brooks v.
Saloy, 334 Ill. App. 93, 79 N.E.2d 97 (1948). Brooks is distinguished by Gordon.
46. Koepke v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 111. App. 3d 799, 800, 284 N.E.2d 671, 672 (1972).
47. U.S. Plywood-Championship Papers, Inc. v. Pan-American Gyro-Tex Co., 345 F.
Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
48. 147 F. Supp. at 404 ("abatement would obviously operate upon any right of action
which might have accrued to the corporation before . . . its dissolution").
49. See, e.g., Henn & Alexander, supra note 10, at 909 n.222.
50. See 30 VAND. L. REV. 238 (1977) (for a collection of authorities and cases).
51. The law of secured transactions in real property provides the necessary incentive
to guarantee that the purchaser corporation assumes mortgages on real estate purchased from
the dissolving corporation. Mortgaged real estate can be foreclosed upon whether the default
in payment giving rise to the foreclosure right of action occurred before or after dissolution
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ate with the purchaser of its assets an assumption of liabilities for
post-dissolution claims.
(2) No Post-Dissolution Claims Are Allowed:
A Statutory Interpretation
An early case that in dictum rejected the Levy assumption that
post-dissolution claims are not affected by the survival statute was
Chadwick v. Air Reduction Company.52 Although holding, primarily
because of language in the Ohio survival statute that differed from
that of the Model Act survival statute,53 that a claimant could main-
tain a post-dissolution claim against a dissolved corporation, the
court stated that "it is, therefore, quite clear that under the Model
Business Corporation Act, and those state statutes patterned after
it, a corporation may be sued for predissolution torts only."'
This dictum was relied upon by another federal court in Bishop
v. Schield Bantam Co.,5 a case construing the Iowa survival stat-
ute.5 1 Defendant corporation had dissolved in 1964. The claimant
had been injured in 1965 by an allegedly defective truck crane man-
ufactured by defendant prior to its dissolution; the action for breach
of warranty and negligence was brought in 1967 against the dis-
solved corporation, its directors, and its officers. After quoting the
dictum from Chadwick, the court held that the claimant's action
was barred under the survival statute not because it was based upon
a post-dissolution claim but because it was brought after the expira-
tion of the two-year survival period. This suggests that the court
might have allowed the claimant's post-dissolution claims if suit
had been brought within the two-year survival period. Nevertheless,
the Chadwick dictum was quoted with approval, and the Bishop
court may have intended that the postulated bar to post-dissolution
claims serve as an alternative ground for its holding.
and whether suit was first brought before or after expiration of the statutory survival period.
See, e.g., Markus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 373 Ill. 557, 27 N.E.2d 463 (1940); Security
Nat'l Bank v. Cohen, 31 Wis. 2d 656, 143 N.W.2d 454 (1966). See also Waughop v. Bartlett,
165 Ill. 124, 46 N.E. 197 (1896) (failure of mortgagee to assert his claim in probate against
deceased mortgagor's estate will not bar the right to foreclosure on the mortgage).
52. 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
53. Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.88 (Page 1964). The Chadwick court found that the
language "or which would have accrued against it," which was contained in the Ohio survival
statute but not in the Model Act provision, "would have no meaning, unless it is construed
to [provide for the continued existence of the dissolved corporation in order to permit the
bringing of causes of action based upon] post-dissolution claims." 239 F. Supp. at 251.
54. Id.
55. 293 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Iowa 1968).
56. IowA CODE AN. § 496A.102 (West 1964). The pertinent language of the Iowa statute
is identical to that of the Model Act.
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(3) Post-Dissolution Claims Allowed During the Two-Year
Survival Period But Not Thereafter: The Statutory Language
Ignored
Another reading of Bishop is apparent in the following quote
from Litts v. Refrigerated Transport Co.: "[I]n Bishop v. Schield
Bantam Company, . . . a claim for injuries filed after the expiration
of the extension period was barred even though the injuries were
sustained after dissolution. ' 57 The federal court in Litts, applying
the Georgia survival statute,5 apparently cited Bishop in order to
argue that the survival statute did apply to post-dissolution
claims. 9 Litts clearly interprets the Bishop holding to be that the
cause of action was precluded not because "the injuries were sus-
tained after dissolution" but because the two-year survival period
had expired. Thus, Bishop can be viewed as applying the survival
period uniformly to predissolution claims and to post-dissolution
claims." This reading of Bishop is inconsistent with a plain meaning
interpretation of the "prior to . . . dissolution" language of section
105. Treating post-dissolution claims in the same way as predissolu-
tion claims in effect renders the language meaningless.
(4) Post-Dissolution Claims Allowed Against Former Shareholders
and Directors, But Not Against Dissolved Corporations: The
Statute's Bar Held Inapplicable to Certain Types of Cases
Since the dictum in Chadwick, the clearest statement concern-
ing the effect of the survival statute on post-dissolution claims is
Stone v. Gibson Refrigerator Sales Corp.,"1 which held that causes
57. 375 F. Supp. 675, 678 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (emphasis added).
58. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1325 (Harrison 1977).
59. The Litts court failed to state explicitly the argument that the quoted sentence was
intended to counter; the court, however, cited Bishop to support its conclusion that "the
policy behind the [survival] statute is favored over the ends of particularized justice." 375
F. Supp. at 678. The policy referred to is apparently the policy of providing certainty and
definiteness to dissolved corporations by setting a definite point after which claims may not
be brought. It is apparently the goal of protecting claimants who assert post-dissolution
claims after expiration of the survival period that the Litts court referred to as the "ends of
particularized justice."
60. Cf. Continental Ins. Co. v. City of Knoxville, 488 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. 1972) (an action
for indemnity was permitted following dissolution even though the primary liability giving
rise to the claim for indemnity apparently arose after dissolution). For commentary stating
that Bishop is susceptible to this interpretation, see Henn & Alexander, supra note 10, at 902.
61. 366 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 52 Wis. 2d
325, 190 N.W.2d 521 (1971). In Bazan, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin quoted with approval
the Chadwick dictum that "under the Model Business Corporation Act, and those state
statutes patterned after it, a corporation may be sued for predissolution torts only." Id. at
335, 190 N.W.2d at 525 (quoting Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 95 (N.D.
Iowa 1968) and Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247, 251 (N.D. Ohio 1965)).
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of action based upon post-dissolution claims cannot be maintained
against dissolved corporations. The reasoning of the court, however,
may limit the application of the holding. Whereas Bishop addressed
a post-dissolution claim against the dissolved corporation, its offi-
cers, and its directors,12 Stone addressed a post-dissolution claim
against the corporation alone. This factor was central to the reason-
ing of the Stone court and therefore may be essential to the Stone
holding.
In Stone, the claimants, who were injured by a fire allegedly
caused by a defective air conditioner, brought a products liability
suit against defendant manufacturer of the air conditioner. Defen-
dant filed a third party complaint against the dissolved corporate
manufacturer of a component part that allegedly caused the claim-
ant's injuries. The manufacturer of the component part had dis-
solved four months before the claimant's injuries and three and one-
half years before the filing of the third party complaint against it.
The federal district court, applying Illinois law, determined that all
actions and claims against corporations would abate upon dissolu-
tion unless continued by the Illinois survival statute. The court
concluded that the survival statute3 continued corporations in ex-
istence only for the purpose of suits based upon predissolution
claims. Because no stgtute continued the existence of corporations
to permit suits based upon post-dissolution claims, the court held
that the post-dissolution claim against the third party defendant
manufacturing corporation had abated, as at common law, upon
that corporation's dissolution.
The reasoning of the Stone court limits its precedential value.
Although the survival statute makes no distinction between claims
against dissolved corporations and claims against their directors
and shareholders, this distinction does follow from the rationale of
the Stone holding. Absent a survival statute, claims against dis-
solved corporations clearly abate at common law, but claims against
directors and shareholders based upon the trust fund theory do not
abate. The Stone court held that post-dissolution claims cannot be
maintained against a dissolved corporation, because, not being con-
Chadwick held that the Ohio survival statute did not preclude tort actions based upon post-
dissolution claims because the Ohio statute differed from the Model Act in that it contained
determinative language authorizing the bringing of actions based upon post-dissolution
claims. The Bazan court acknowledged the distinction drawn in Chadwick and stated that
"neither the Wisconsin nor Illinois legislature has seen fit to so modify the language of the
Model Act." 52 Wis. 2d at 335, 190 N.W.2d at 525.
62. 293 F. Supp. at 96.
63. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.94 (Smith-Hurd 1954 & Supp. 1978).
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tinued by the survival statute, all post-dissolution claims against
the dissolved corporation abate. This is not true for post-dissolution
claims against directors and shareholders. 4 Thus, the Stone inter-
pretation of "prior to . . . dissolution" does not preclude share-
holder and director liability for post-dissolution contingent claims
against dissolved corporations.
Although Stone merely left room for shareholder and director
liability, in United States v. Palakow" the Seventh Circuit ex-
pressly held that this liability exists. In Palakow, the Small Busi-
ness Administration (SBA) brought a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duties against defendants Palakow and Levin, both former
officers and directors of a dissolved corporation. The SBA had ac-
cepted a pledge of defendant Levin's shares in the corporation as
security for repayment of a loan. Prior to dissolution of the corpora-
tion, the SBA had foreclosed on and purchased the shares. On May
4, 1964, the corporation dissolved, but did not make liquidating
distributions to the SBA, which had become a shareholder by virtue
of its purchase at the foreclosure sale. The cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duties owed by Levin and Palakow, as officers and
directors, to the SBA as a shareholder, was commenced on August
22, 1966, following expiration of Wisconsin's two-year survival pe-
riod.6 The issue addressed by the court was not, as in Stone,
whether the claimant could maintain a cause of action arising after
dissolution, but whether the claimant could maintain an action
brought after the two-year survival period. Nevertheless, the
Palakow court based its holding upon the nonapplication of the
survival statute to certain causes of action, and, for that reason, the
holding is relevant to the present inquiry whether the survival stat-
ute bars post-dissolution claims.
The Palakow court was unclear whether it was giving alterna-
tive grounds for its holding or attempting to reinforce its holding
with strong dictum about a secondary issue. The court first held
that the suit was not against Palakow as a director but against him
individually; thus the suit fell outside the reach of the survival
statute, which by its language applies to suits against directors, not
suits against individuals.6" As though unsatisfied with its first hold-
64. Cf. People v. Parker, 30 Ill. 2d 486, 490, 197 N.E.2d 30, 31-32 (1964) ("Defendant
offers no authority for the necessary premise that dissolution of a corporation abates liability
incurred by its directors, and we do not know of any principle that requires that result.").
For a detailed treatment of Parker, see text accompanying notes 119-29 infra.
65. 438 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'g, 298 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
66. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.787 (West 1957).
67. For a discussion of this first holding of Palakow, see note 164 and text accompanying
notes 90-93 infra. The court also held that this was not a suit by, or on behalf of, the dissolved
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ing, however, the court went on to say that, even if the cause of
action against Palakow were against a "director qua director,"6" the
cause of action was based upon a claim that would not have abated
at common law. Adding to this premise the notion that the survival
statute affects only claims that abated at common law, such as
claims brought directly against corporations, the Palakow court
concluded that the survival statute and its survival period did not
apply to trust fund causes of action for breach of fiduciary duties
owed by directors to shareholders. Because it held that the survival
statute had no effect upon claims that did not abate at common law,
the Palakow court did not need to interpret the "prior to. . . disso-
lution" language of the survival statute to reach its conclusion.
Under the court's reasoning, the phrase "prior to . . .dissolution"
applies only to claims that could have been brought directly against
the dissolved corporation because only those claims abated at com-
mon law.
The Palakow holding directly controls cases addressing claims
against directors for the contingent liabilities of their dissolved cor-
porations. The alleged breach of duty in Palakow was the duty to
distribute properly the assets of the corporation. Although the
claimant in Palakow was a shareholder, the fiduciary duty that was
breached is owed to shareholders and creditors alike." Thus, under
Palakow, the trust fund theory creates director liability in spite of
the provisions and limitations of the survival statute. This conclu-
sion is the same for both the alternative Palakow holdings.
At first glance, Palakow appears inconsistent with Bishop.70 In
Bishop the court dismissed a third party complaint against a dis-
solved corporation, its directors, and its officers on the ground that
the cause of action was barred by the survival statute. Bishop thus
applied the survival statute to a cause of action that was both based
upon a post-dissolution claim and filed after expiration of the sur-
vival period. The Bishop court, however, did not discuss the nature
of the cause of action against the directors and officers. The direc-
tors and officers possibly were joined merely as trustees of the assets
of the dissolved corporation. If so, the cause of action would have
been against the corporation alone, with the directors and officers
corporation, but rather a suit for the SBA itself. 438 F.2d at 1179. Compare note 38 supra
with text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
68. 438 F.2d at 1179.
69. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. The fiduciary duty also is owed to
contingent claimants. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
70. 293 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Iowa 1968).
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joined only as representatives. 7' That the court did not mention any
breach of fiduciary duties by the directors, which would support a
trust fund theory cause of action, argues for this possibility. The
absence of a trust fund theory cause of action clearly distinguishes
Bishop from Palakow, because Palakow was based upon the survival
of that cause of action at common law. The true nature of the
Bishop claim against the directors is uncertain, however, and
Bishop indeed may be inconsistent with Palakow.
The Palakow holding reinforces the conclusion that the Stone
interpretation of "prior to . . . dissolution" precludes only causes
of action brought directly against the dissolved corporation. Post-
dissolution claims against shareholders and directors are, under the
Palakow reasoning, outside the scope of the survival statute. When
thus read together and harmonized, Stone and Palakow support the
proposition that, although only predissolution claims support
causes of action against a dissolved corporation, post-dissolution
claims support trust fund theory causes of action against former
shareholders and directors of the dissolved corporation. This propo-
sition, however, is open to challenge.72 Several cases have held that
the survival statute bars trust fund theory actions filed after expira-
tion of the statutory survival period. These cases clearly apply the
71. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 8189, 8191. The distinction between suits against
directors and officers individually and suits against them in their capacities as trustees of the
dissolved corporation's assets is clarified in Waggoner v. Edwards, 68 S.W.2d 655, 663-64
(Tex. Ct. App. 1934) (opinion on motion for rehearing), in which certain pleas filed by three
directors individually were held insufficient because the pleas should have been entered on
behalf of the dissolved corporation or alternatively by the directors as trustees.
72. One problem with the conclusion drawn from the Stone-Palakow reasoning arises
from the nature of the trust fund theory, especially as that theory relates to shareholder
liability. The trust fund theory was developed in equity. A prerequisite to relief in equity is
the exhaustion of all remedies at law. See Wallach, supra note 23, at 331-32. This requires
the showing of a nulla bona return from an execution issued against the shareholder's dis-
solved corporation. See 4 J. POMEROY, EQurry JUMSPRUDENCE § 1415 (5th ed. 1941). Of course,
execution will issue against dissolved corporations only if valid claims exist upon which
judgments can be obtained. Under Stone, and consistent with the reasoning in Palakow, post-
dissolution claims against corporations abate at common law upon dissolution, and therefore
will not support causes of action brought directly against dissolved corporations. Because no
judgment can be obtained against dissolved corporations for post-dissolution claims, no nulla
bona return can be presented in support of the need for equitable relief. Thus, arguably no
trust fund theory action can be maintained against former shareholders for post-dissolution
claims. This problem, however, is illusory. The nulla bona return is required only because it
shows that the remedies at law have been exhausted and have failed. Under Stone, the
remedy at law is eliminated by the survival statute's bar to causes of action based upon post-
dissolution claims. Since no remedy is available at law under the Stone-Palakow reasoning,
no evidence can be presented relevant to the exhaustion of that nonexistent remedy. Conse-
quently, the absence of a remedy at law under the Stone-Palakow analysis fulfills the prere-
quisite to suits in equity under the trust fund theory.
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survival statute to claims that did not abate at common law. These
cases and the validity of Palakow are discussed in the following
subsection of this Article.
B. Does Section 105 Prohibit Trust Fund Actions Brought After
the Survival Period Expires?
(1) General Rule That Trust Fund Actions Are Subject to the
Survival Statute's Bar
Numerous cases have addressed the issue whether a particular
cause of action is precluded because it was not commenced within
two years after the date of dissolution. Palakow was this type of
case. Clearly, actions brought directly against dissolved
corporations are precluded if commenced after the statutory sur-
vival period expires because those causes of action continue only
because of the survival statute, which postpones abatement only
during the survival period. This subsection of the Article discusses
primarily whether causes of action against shareholders and
directors for the contingent liabilities of their dissolved corporations
are barred after the survival period expires. Using the reasoning of
Palakow, it was concluded in the preceding subsection of this Arti-
cle that post-dissolution claims would support causes of action
against shareholders and directors of dissolved corporations. A more
complete consideration of the survival statute's effect upon trust
fund theory causes of action is possible with cases addressing the
survival period issue because more cases have addressed that issue
than the issue whether the survival statute bars post-dissolution
claims brought within the survival period.
In Palakow, acknowledging that its task was to construe the
Wisconsin survival statute as would a Wisconsin state court, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that "[t]hose suits which would not
have abated upon dissolution are not covered by Section 94 [the
Illinois survival statute]. We think that a Wisconsin court would
construe Section 180.787 [the Wisconsin survival statute] in a sim-
ilar manner. 7 3 The District Court for the Eastern District of Wis-
consin had reached the opposite conclusion in Palakow.74 The court
reasoned as follows:
73. 438 F.2d at 1179.
74. United States v. Palakow, 298 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd, 438 F.2d 1177
(7th Cir. 1971). The lower court decision was cited with approval on a related issue by the




The legislative history behind § 180.787 [the Wisconsin survival statute]
suggests that the legislature was primarily concerned with relieving
shareholders of their equitable liability after two years from the date of dissolu-
tion. Nevertheless, § 180.787, in reasonably clear language, includes officers
and directors, and this court cannot ignore those terms in construing the stat-
ute. It is my conclusion that the legislature of Wisconsin has barred claims
against directors when such claims are brought more than two years after...
dissolution. 5
Commentators generally agree with the lower court's assessment of
the Wisconsin legislature's intent." The drafters of the 1951 Wiscon-
sin Business Corporation Act had the "avowed purpose of limiting
shareholder liability to two years after dissolution,"" legislatively
overruling a line of Wisconsin cases holding that an earlier similar
statute78 did not bar equitable actions against shareholders follow-
ing expiration of the three-year period established by the statute for
settling the affairs of dissolved corporations.
79
75. 298 F. Supp. at 1380 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
76. Schoone, supra note 36, at 422-23; Wallach, supra note 23, at 330 ("[Early Wis-
consin decisions ... concluded that Wisconsin's postponed abatement statute did not dis-
place the 'trust fund' theory .... It was the intention of the draftsmen of the 1951 Wisconsin
Business Corporation Law to statutorily overrule these decisions by making the statutory
remedy exclusive."); Young, Some Comments on the New Wisconsin Business Corporation
Law, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 5, 15; see Tyrrell, Introduction to the Business Corporation Law, 22
Wis. STAT. ANN. XXV, xxxv (West 1957). See generally 33 MARQ. L. REv. 114 (1949).
77. Schoone, supra note 36, at 427. The intent of the drafters of Model Act section 105
is not as clear. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2d § 105 comment (West 1971); Wallach,
supra note 23, at 330. But cf. Wallach, supra note 23, at 331 ("[The postponed abatement
statutes logically would serve no real function if the 'trust fund' theory survived the adoption
of such statutes."). Under the Model Act formulation, liquidation of the corporation precedes
final dissolution. MODEL AcT, supra note 6, § 92. Thus, from the beginning of the survival
period the dissolved corporation has no assets. If expiration of the survival period does not
bar trust fund theory causes of action, then the survival statute has no readily apparent
purpose. For more detailed discussion of this problem, see text accompanying notes 143-51
infra. At least one state legislature was perplexed by the survival statute's lack of purpose
when liquidation of the corporation preceded expiration of the survival period. See Morrison,
Summary of Amendments to Chapter 351: The General and Business Corporation Act of
Missouri, 22 J. Mo. B. 19 (1966), reprinted in Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.565 comment (Vernon
1966) (Morrison, 1965 Amendment).
78. Wis. STAT. § 181.02 (1949) (no longer in force). The older nonabatement statute
provided that upon dissolution corporations "shall nevertheless continue . . . for 3 years
thereafter for the purpose of prosecuting and defending actions, and of enabling them to settle
and close up their business, dispose of and convey their property and divide their assets and
for no other purpose . . . ." The older nonabatement statute was replaced in 1951 by two
statutory provisions. The first is a "two-step dissolution" provision patterned after the MODEL
Acr, supra note 6, §§ 85-87, 92-93, which requires the winding-up of the affairs of the corpora-
tion before final dissolution. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.753, 180.755, 180.757, 180.765, 180.767
(West 1957). The second is the Wisconsin survival statute. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.787 (West
1957 & Supp. 1978-1979).
79. One of the cases statutorily overruled was Lindmann v. Rusk, 125 Wis. 210, 104
N.W. 119 (1905), which the Seventh Circuit in Palakow cited to support its conclusion that
"since . . . a claim alleging that a director has breached his fiduciary duty . . . may be
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Despite the wealth of commentary about the Wisconsin legisla-
ture's intent, few cases have considered whether the Wisconsin sur-
vival statute relieves shareholders and directors of their equitable
liabilities after the survival period expires .8 The only Wisconsin
case available to either the federal district court or the Seventh
Circuit in Palakow was Security National Bank v. Cohen,81 which
expressly declined to rule on the question. In Cohen, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court based its decision on a well-recognized rule that the
death of a debtor does not extinguish a mortgage or bar its foreclo-
sure . 2 This rule of secured property law justifies an exception to the
common law rule of abatement and to any corresponding bar that
the survival statute imposes after the survival period expires. In
reaching its decision, the Cohen court relied upon an Illinois case
recognizing that the nonapplication of the survival statute to mort-
gage foreclosure suits was an exception to the usual rule: "[W]hen
this hotel corporation was dissolved it could not sue or be sued after
two years, but the obligations of its mortgage survived, and...
such remedy will be granted against the mortgaged property."83 The
Cohen court also recognized the validity of the mortgage foreclosure
suit, but expressly declined to suggest whether trust fund theory
suits against shareholders and directors similarly are excepted from
the survival statute:
[E]ven though sec. 180.787, Stats., [the survival statute], could be in-
terpreted to abate a cause of action against a shareholder or officer of a dis-
solved corporation once the two-year period has passed, that question is not
before the court .... Plaintiff has not demanded a deficiency judgment
against defendant Cohen, but only demands judgment of foreclosure .... 11
Thus, having no controlling Wisconsin case law, the Seventh Circuit
was free to decide Palakow as it did even though the court's predic-
tion as to what a Wisconsin court might decide cannot be sup-
ported. 5
brought after the existence of the corporation has terminated, Section 180.787 [the Wisconsin
survival statute] has no application to this suit." 438 F.2d at 1179.
80. See Schoone, supra note 36, at 423; Wallach, supra note 23, at 330-31.
81. 31 Wis. 2d 656, 143 N.W.2d 454 (1966).
82. Id. at 661-62, 143 N.W.2d at 457.
83. Id. at 663, 143 N.W.2d at 458 (quoting Markus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 373
III. 557, 562, 27 N.E.2d 463, 466 (1940)).
84. 31 Wis. 2d at 660, 143 N.W.2d at 456.
85. No Wisconsin decision since Palakow is directly on point. For that reason, the
Seventh Circuit's prediction has yet to be proved or disproved. That the survival statute
continues to bar actions following expiration of the survival period is clear from statements
made by the Wisconsin Supreme Court concerning the Illinois survival statute. The state-
ments were meant to instruct the lower courts on remand. Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 52 Wis.
2d 325, 335-36, 190 N.W.2d 521, 526 (1971).
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If there is a general rule that claims against shareholders and
directors are barred after the survival period expires, then the
Palakow exception for claims that did not abate at common law
consumes the general rule, because only claims against corporations
abated at common law. The Seventh Circuit in Palakow based its
prediction of what Wisconsin courts would hold upon its interpreta-
tion of Illinois case law under the survival statute.86 The accuracy
of that interpretation, however, is open to question. The following
examination of Illinois case law has two purposes: first, it will deter-
mine the accuracy of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the
Illinois case law under the survival statute; second, it will trace
judicial attitudes toward the applicability of the survival statute to
trust fund theory causes of action in a state whose judicial decisions
have been influential in the construction of the Model Act survival
statute. 7
To the extent that Illinois cases assume a general rule barring
claims after two years, the cases undercut the Palakow holding. Two
early decisions support the contention that equitable actions
against shareholders are barred after the survival period expires.8
Other decisions hold shareholders and directors liable after two
years by resorting to reasoning that seemingly accepts a general rule
barring claims, but at the same time finds exceptions to the general
rule. The following subsections discuss these exceptions, if they cor-
rectly can be so characterized.
(2) Exception for Actions Against Individuals
In Krauter v. Adler,89 the appellate court apparently assumed
a general rule that, following expiration of the survival period, the
survival statute bars causes of action based upon theories that the
defendants are liable as officers, directors, or shareholders of their
dissolved corporations. Nevertheless, the court decided that the ac-
86. 438 F.2d at 1179.
87. The survival statute has been construed frequently in Illinois; moreover, the courts
of other states frequently adhere to Illinois case law interpreting the statute. See, e.g., Secu-
rity Nat'l Bank v. Cohen, 31 Wis. 2d 656, 143 N.W.2d 454 (1966). The annotations to the
Missouri survival statute refer to both Wisconsin and Illinois cases. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.565
(Vernon 1966) (Notes of Decisions). Similarly, commentators rely heavily on Illinois cases to
answer questions left unresolved by the Model Act. See, e.g., Schoone, supra note 36, at 423.
88. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Teter, 117 F.2d 716, 727-28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 620 (1941) (applying Illinois law); Markus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 373 Ill. 557,
562, 27 N.E.2d 463, 465-66 (1940) (The survival statute, "limiting suits against the corpora-
tions, its officers or stockholders, to a period of two years after dissolution . . . barred any
remedy against the corporation, its officers or stockholders . ); see Schoone, supra note
36, at 424-25.
89. 328 Ill. App. 127, 65 N.E.2d 215 (1946) (abstract of opinion).
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tion could be maintained even though the complaint had been filed
following expiration of the survival period. To explain its decision,
the Krauter court offered two exceptions to the general rule. First,
the court noted that the untimely complaint was permitted under
a statute providing for the amendment of complaints, provided the
amendment grew out of the same transaction or occurrence. Since
plaintiff in Krauter had filed his original complaint within the two-
year survival period, the amended complaint was timely. Second,
the court found an exception to the general rule in that plaintiff's
complaint alleged defendants were liable not as officers, directors,
and shareholders, but as individuals. The complaint, alleging a
cause of action sounding in tort, asserted that defendants had con-
spired to induce their corporation to breach its contractual obliga-
tion to pay certain brokerage commissions to plaintiff. Defendants
induced this breach by dissolving the corporation.
The Krauter court's reasoning is similar to the rationale under-
lying the first holding of Palakow that suits against directors as
individuals are outside the scope of the survival statute. In Palakow,
the Seventh Circuit phrased the primary issue before it as follows:
The district court dismissed the government's suit on the ground that the
action was barred by the two year limitation of Section 180.787 [the Wisconsin
survival statute]. The basis of the court's decision was that SBA's suit did not
charge "personal tortious conduct" directly against Palakow and Levin indi-
vidually, but charged conduct "related and integral" to Belvedere's [the dis-
solved corporation's] affairs. This finding presents the main issue before us."
Just as the action in Palakow could be maintained after the survival
period expired because it was against the former officers and direc-
tors in their individual capacities for breach of duty and wrongful
conversion of assets, the action in Krauter could be maintained after
the survival period expired because it was against the former offi-
cers, directors, and shareholders in their individual capacities for
inducing a breach of contract.
The test for the Krauter-Palakow exception to the general rule
is whether the plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action against
the defendant individually or as an officer, director, or share-
holder." The line between these causes of action is easy to draw
90. 438 F.2d at 1178.
91. The holdings of Krauter and Palakow place suits for inducing breach of contract
and suits for breach of fiduciary duties in that gray area of suits that, although brought
against former shareholders, officers, or directors, were probably outside the contemplation
of those who drafted and enacted survival statutes. Whether the drafters and enactors of
survival statutes contemplated the preclusion, following expiration of the survival period, of
actions brought pursuant to the securities laws or the antitrust laws is open to question.
Regarding certain actions brought pursuant to section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of
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when the defendant clearly has acted outside the scope of his du-
ties-as, for example, when the defendant, even though at a corpo-
rate directors' or shareholders' meeting, physically assaults a fellow
director or shareholder. It is more difficult to draw the line after
examining the facts in Krauter and Palakow. In Krauter an officer,
director, or shareholder apparently committed an individual tort by
voting to dissolve the corporation with knowledge of outstanding
contracts that would be breached by dissolution. That voting as a
shareholder or director is outside the scope of one's corporate capac-
ity is difficult to accept. Furthermore, in Palakow a director was
liable individually for failing to properly distribute the dissolved
corporation's assets. Surely distribution of the assets of a dissolved
corporation is not outside the scope of a director's duties; in many
states that duty is statutorily imposed . 2 Under Krauter and
Palakow, therefore, the individual/corporate capacity test for ex-
cepting certain claims from the survival statute bar is difficult to
apply. Moreover, it appears that any plaintiff by the exercise of
sufficient ingenuity in phrasing his complaint could avoid the bar
imposed by the survival statute.
In Krauter and Palakow elements of self-dealing were present
that may have influenced the courts in concluding that the share-
holders and directors were acting outside their corporate capacities.
If treated as determinative, the element of self-dealing could render
the Krauter-Palakow individual/corporate capacity test workable.
The self-dealing in Palakow was evident:
The gravamen of the complaint is that both Palakow and Levin were aware of
SBA's interest in Belvedere [the dissolved corporation] stock and that the two
of them, acting as officers and directors, failed to distribute to SBA its share
of the assets of the corporation, and that Palakow wrongfully converted the
SBA's share of the assets to his own use.'
3
The self-dealing in Krauter was less evident. Plaintiffs complaint
alleged that defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of his contract
right, and to that end they intentionally and willfully refused to pay
franchise taxes so that the corporation would be dissolved by law.
In deciding whether to sustain the trial court's dismissal of plain-
tiffs complaint, the Krauter court accepted the allegations stated
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), see Weiskopf, Remedies Under Rule 1~b-5, 1972-73 CoRP. PRAc.
COMMENTATOR 25, 61-64. Regarding antitrust actions, see Imperial Film Exch. v. General Film
Co., 244 F. 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Comment, Corporate Dissolution and the Anti-Trust Laws,
21 U. Cm. L. REv. 480 (1954). But cf. Galter v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 186 F.2d 810 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 818 (1951) (Federal Trade Commission cease and desist order
having prospective effect held not to extend beyond expiration of the survival period).
92. See W. Fixrchna, supra note 1, § 8175.
93. 438 F.2d at 1179.
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as true. As stated in the complaint, it appears that defendants
converted plaintiffs contract right in order to increase the value of
defendants' shares in the assets of the corporation. In both Palakow
and Krauter, therefore, the defendants engaged in pecuniary self-
dealing; thus it is possible that directors who do not engage in this
type of self-dealing may escape liability even though they may
breach their fiduciary duties by improperly distributing assets or by
failing to provide for contingent liabilities.
Self-dealing is at least one potential component of the test for
distinguishing defendants who act in their individual capacities
from those who act in their corporate capacities. At least one case,
however, sustained causes of action by shareholders as individuals
even though no self-dealing had occurred. In Brooks v. Saloy,"1 for-
mer shareholders and the heirs of certain former shareholders
brought an action to remove a cloud on title and for certain other
equitable relief. The tax foreclosure sale that created the cloud on
title occurred on April 20, 1943, dissolution followed on January 6,
1944, and the cause of action was filed more than two years later,
on April 24, 1946. Thus, the cause of action based upon a predissolu-
tion claim was brought following expiration of the survival period.
The Brooks court concluded that plaintiffs could maintain their
equitable action despite expiration of the survival period because
they brought the action not as shareholders but as individuals. The
court reasoned that upon dissolution of the corporation title to the
real property of the corporation passed to the shareholders as ten-
ants in common, and therefore plaintiffs brought the suit as individ-
ual owners of the land rather than as former shareholders. 5 Conspir-
acy and self-dealing appear irrelevant to the court's holding, and
certainly they were irrelevant to the court's characterization of the
claim as one brought by individuals rather than as one brought by
plaintiffs in their capacity as shareholders.
Edwards v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co." is an Illinois
case that supports the Palakow holding. In Edwards, plaintiffs sued
to recover damages for injury to their lands allegedly caused by the
coal mining operations of a dissolved corporation. The claimants
94. 334 Ill. App. 93, 79 N.E.2d 97 (1948).
95. Id. at 99-101, 79 N.E.2d at 100-01. See also Laning v. National Ribbon & Carbon
Paper Mfg. Co., 40 F. Supp. 1005, 1006-07 (N.D. Ill. 1941), modified, 125 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.
1942) (Court dismissed a cause of action to clarify title to certain patents, stating that the
dissolved corporation would be a necessary party if it were in existence and therefore "those
who became the owners of its property after dissolution are necessary parties." Because the
necessary parties were not joined, the requested relief could not be granted.).
96. 79 111. App. 2d 48, 223 N.E.2d 163 (1967).
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brought the action against the dissolved corporation, its directors,
and its sole shareholder, another corporation. 7 In other words, the
dissolved corporation was the wholly owned subsidiary of defendant
parent corporation. In addition to the claim for damages, and as an
alternative theory of recovery, plaintiffs pleaded that defendant
parent corporation had defrauded plaintiffs by inducing them to
refrain from filing suit against the dissolved corporation until the
survival period had expired. Defendants argued that expiration of
the two-year survival period barred the causes of action. The trial
court dismissed the complaint against all defendants-the dissolved
corporation, the directors, and the shareholder parent corporation.
The instant court affirmed the dismissal as to the dissolved corpora-
tion and the directors, but reversed the trial court's dismissal as to
both claims against the shareholder parent corporation."
The fraud claim in Edwards was held to support independent
causes of action that could be maintained against the shareholder
parent corporation despite expiration of the survival period." Al-
though the issue was not raised, the alleged fraud apparently oc-
curred "during the two-year period" following dissolution,", which
made the action one based upon a post-dissolution claim. The
Edwards court failed to explain why the causes of action based upon
the post-dissolution fraud claim could be maintained following ex-
piration of the survival period. Several explanations are possible.
The holding is consistent with the Levy holding that only predisso-
lution claims are barred by expiration of the survival period.," Be-
cause this analysis was not mentioned, however, it is unlikely that
the Edwards court considered it. The court seems to have assumed
that the cause of action for fraud stated a claim against the share-
holder parent corporation in its individual capacity. In this respect,
the Edwards holding is based upon a ground common to Krauter
and the first alternative holding of Palakow. The fraud was under-
taken by the shareholder parent corporation not in its capacity as a
shareholder but in its individual capacity. The fraud was intended
97. The shareholder owned all the shares except for the qualifying shares held by each
of the five directors. The court appears to have treated the directors as directors only and
not as both directors and shareholders. Id. at 51, 223 N.E.2d at 164.
98. For a discussion of the significance of dismissing the actions against the directors,
see note 71 supra and accompanying text.
99. 79 Ill. App. 2d at 52, 223 N.E.2d at 165 ("[D]o those parts of the amended com-
plaints which allege fraud on the part of the railway company state a cause of action?"); see
id. at 55, 223 N.E.2d at 166 ("The essential elements of an action for fraud have been
alleged.").
100. Id. at 55, 223 N.E.2d at 166.
101. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
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to benefit the perpetrator at the expense of the claimants against
the dissolved corporation; therefore self-dealing was present.
The only apparent distinction between Edwards on the one
hand, and Krauter and Palakow on the other, is that in Edwards
defendant committed a tort following dissolution, whereas defen-
dants in Krauter and Palakow committed torts prior to dissolu-
tion."2 It is arguable that a post-dissolution tort is much more
clearly outside one's capacity as a director or shareholder than a
predissolution tort. So apparent is the distinction that it can be
extracted readily from the following statement, the only one Profes-
sor Fletcher makes that directly addresses liabilities for post-
dissolution claims:
Under certain circumstances a corporation may become liable for torts
committed after its dissolution, as where a de facto existence continues the
corporation so as to carry with it liability then accruing. Ordinarily, however,
a corporation has not even a de facto existence after the expiration of its
charter, and where this is the case, such a liability does not arise. The remedy
would be against the individuals committing the wrong."3
The quoted section underscores the individual nature of directors'
and shareholders' liabilities for post-dissolution acts, even acts that
would have been within their corporate capacities if committed
while the corporation was still in existence. Far from buttressing the
Krauter-Palakow rationale, however, the quoted section fails to sug-
gest whether the survival statute bars claims against defendants
either individually or in their corporate capacities.
(3) Piercing the Corporate Veil Exception
The Edwards court also upheld the claim for damages against
the shareholder parent corporation. Undoubtedly the claim for
damages was based upon an injury caused by the dissolved subsidi-
ary corporation. Thus, plaintiffs' causes of action against the parent
corporation were clearly against it in its capacity as a shareholder
and not because it had committed any wrongful act itself. The
causes of action were based upon a claim that but for the dissolution
102. In Krauter, the inducement to breach the contract was the conspiracy that culmi-
nated in dissolition. In Palakow, the breach of duty and conversion were connected with the
distribution of the corporation's assets that under the Illinois two-step dissolution process
occurs prior to the final act of dissolution, the filing of the articles of dissolution. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.80 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); see MoDEL Acr, supra note 6, § 92.
103. W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 8141. Torts committed after dissolution, however,
should be distinguished from those arising after dissolution. The latter include torts in which
the harm occurred after dissolution or the discovery giving rise to a cause of action occurred




would have been maintainable against the subsidiary corporation
alone. The Edwards court did not make clear its reason for sustain-
ing the causes of action for damages, but the factors considered by
the court indicate that it may have analyzed the damages claim as
though the case were one of piercing the corporate veil. When cases
lack evidence that the shareholders did not treat the corporation as
a separate entity, piercing the corporate veil usually is predicated
upon some theory of undercapitalization. 04 Although the Edwards
court did not mention undercapitalization, it may have concluded
and, because there was no other ground for using a piercing the veil
analysis, should have concluded that the dissolution and liquidation
of the tortfeasor corporation fulfilled this prerequisite. It is never-
theless conceptually unsatisfactory to argue that dissolution and
liquidation "undercapitalize" the subsidiary and therefore permit
recovery under a piercing the corporate veil theory.
Perhaps, then, Edwards should be viewed not as a case of pierc-
ing the corporate veil but as a case of transferee liability. The "unity
of interest and ownership between"105 defendant shareholder parent
corporation and the tortfeasor subsidiary corporation, which the
court apparently found determinative of the damages claim, is rele-
vant to both theories of recovery against defendant. Unity of interest
and ownership is one of the characteristics frequently used to justify
imposition of transferee liability; the theory is that the transferee
corporation that purchased substantially all the assets of the trans-
feror corporation is a mere continuation of the transferor corpora-
tion."0 If this theory of liability is accepted as the rationale for the
Edwards decision, then the liability of the shareholder parent corpo-
ration is easily explained without reference to the survival statute.
The liability is imposed on the defendant not in its capacity as a
shareholder of the dissolved corporation but in its capacity as a
corporate transferee of the working assets and operations of the
tortfeasor transferor corporation. Under this rationale, the Edwards
holding as to the damages claim creates no potential liabilities for
shareholders or directors who receive or distribute nonworking as-
sets of the dissolved corporation following the sale of substantially
all the working assets to a third party. The potential liability of
shareholders who receive, and directors who distribute, working as-
104. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d
576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155
N.E. 58 (1926).
105. 79 Ill. App. 2d at 52-53, 223 N.E.2d at 165.
106. For a discussion of this theory of liability, which also has been referred to as the
de facto merger doctrine, see 30 VAND. L. REv. 238 (1977).
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sets for the purpose of continuing the business operations of the
corporation in another form-partnership or sole proprietorship, for
example-is outside the scope of this Article.
The problem with this interpretation is that the Edwards court
apparently failed to discuss transferee liability."' The court empha-
sized the parent-subsidiary relationship rather than the status of
defendant as a transferee corporation that continued the working
operations of the tortfeasor. Furthermore, the parent-subsidiary re-
lationship is merely a special type of shareholder-corporation rela-
tionship. Although the holding in Edwards may be limited to this
special type of relationship, there is no apparent reason why pierc-
ing the corporate veil between a subsidiary corporation and its par-
ent should be treated differently from a piercing of the veil between
a corporation and its individual shareholders.0 8
Therefore, if piercing the corporate veil is the rationale for per-
mitting the damages claim in Edwards after the survival period
expired, then this is a significant exception to the postulated
general rule that expiration of the survival period precludes the
bringing of actions against former shareholders of the dissolved cor-
poration. Furthermore, if it is assumed, as it must have been by the
Edwards court if a justifiable reading is to be given to the case, that
dissolution and liquidation of the tortfeasor corporation satisfied the
undercapitalization prerequisite to piercing the corporate veil, then
the exception may be broader than the postulated rule. One caveat
is that courts have traditionally been more inclined to pierce the
corporate veil for tort claims than for contract claims.'0 Thus,
courts following Edwards should be more likely, following expiration
of the survival period, to permit the bringing of tort claims than
breach of warranty claims.
One final point is worth noting in this discussion of Edwards.
Whether the claim for damages arose before or after dissolution is
not discussed, and therefore some of the relevant facts may have
107. Defendant, in an effort to have the damages claim dismissed, cited a case that
characterized the issue as one of transferee liability rather than as one of piercing the corpo-
rate veil. The case had held that a transferee mining operator was not liable "for surface
subsidence over areas mined only by his predecessor in title, where there has been no express
assumption of such liability, and the predecessor is a wholly unrelated business entity."
Tankersley v. Peabody Coal Co., 31 Ill. 2d 496,498, 202 N.E.2d 498, 499 (1964). The Edwards
court distinguished this case and a similar one by stating that the predecessor in title in
Edwards was a subsidiary of defendant rather than a wholly unrelated entity. 79 Ill. App. 2d
at 54, 223 N.E.2d at 166.
108. See note 104 supra.
109. Compare Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955) with
Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
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been omitted from the opinion. From the facts presented, however,
the dissolution of the tortfeasor subsidiary apparently occurred be-
fore the surface subsidence that caused the injury. 110 The statute of
limitations in causes of action like those in Edwards begins to run
when the subsidence occurs."' Plaintiffs, therefore, were permitted
to maintain causes of action based upon a post-dissolution claim
following expiration of the survival period. Thus, the exception, if
any, for causes of action predicated upon a theory of piercing the
corporate veil is a complete exception to application of the survival
statute and not just an exception of predissolution claims from ap-
plication of the bar imposed by expiration of the survival period."2
(4) Three Additional Exceptions: Post-Dissolution Claims,
Fraudulent Conveyances, and Particular Statutory Causes of
Action
Having postulated a general rule that expiration of the survival
period bars causes of action against shareholders, three theoretical
exceptions, in addition to those previously discussed, deserve atten-
tion. These three exceptions also have support in the Illinois case
law. Two of the exceptions require no lengthy treatment at this
point. The first is the exception created by the Levy interpretation
of the survival statute's language. '3 Under Levy, post-dissolution
claims are expressly excluded from the survival statute limitation.
The second exception is for causes of action against recipient share-
holders predicated upon a theory that the liquidating distribution
was a fraudulent conveyance."' In La Crosse Manufacturing Co. v.
Springer, "15 the claimants' original judgment against the dissolved
corporation and the fraudulent transfer of corporate assets occurred
before dissolution of the corporation. Thus the cause of action was
based upon a predissolution claim. The equity action that the court
permitted following expiration of the survival period was against the
dissolved corporation's shareholders, who had both induced and
received the fraudulent transfers. Although the transfers in Springer
110. 79 Ill. App. 2d at 54, 223 N.E.2d at 166.
111. RFSTATEmENT OF TORTS, Scope and Introductory Note, §§ 817-821 (1939).
112. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
114. See Consolidated Coal Co. v. Flynn Coal Co., 274 Ill. App. 405, 412 (1934) ("We
are not disposed to hold that in a proper case where the officers of a defunct corporation by
fraudulent conduct conceal and convert corporate property, a bill to account is required to
be filed within the two years provided for by the Corporation Act after dissolution . .
See also note 10 supra.
115. 323 Ill. App. 525, 56 N.E.2d 146 (1944) (abstract of opinion).
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were not clearly the liquidating distributions themselves,'M liquidat-
ing distributions have been held to be fraudulent conveyances, and
creditors with contingent claims have been held to be among those
who have standing to pursue transferred assets into the hands of
recipient shareholders.' Carried to its logical conclusion, therefore,
any distribution to shareholders may be a fraudulent conveyance
that can be attacked following expiration of the survival period."'
Thus, the fraudulent conveyances exception to the postulated gen-
eral rule of the survival statute's bar may consume the general rule
itself.
The third of the three exceptions derives from a narrow reading
of the holding in People v. Parker."' In Parker, the State of Illinois
brought an action against a former director for unpaid personal
property taxes assessed against the former director's dissolved cor-
poration. The taxes were assessed in 1953 and 1954; the corporation
dissolved in 1955; and the suit against the former director was filed
in 1961. Thus the claimant brought an action based upon a predisso-
lution claim following expiration of the survival period. The claim-
ant also was allowed to recover interest on the unpaid personal
116. Id. In Springer, the assets alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed were funds
withdrawn from corporate bank accounts prior to dissolution. Under the Illinois two-step
dissolution procedure, any liquidating distributions would have preceded final dissolution,
and therefore these distributions also would have given rise to predissolution claims. For the
present version of the Illinois two-step dissolution statute, which is virtually identical to the
version in effect when Springer was decided, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.80 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978).
117. Menconi v. Davison, 80 Ill. App. 2d 1, 225 N.E.2d 139 (1967); see note 10 supra.
See generally Weller v. Schulte, 137 Ill. App. 520 (1907).
118. Section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act renders fraudulent as to
creditors any transfer for no consideration that will render the transferor insolvent. Liquida-
tion renders corporate transferors insolvent and shareholders who receive assets in distribu-
tion give no consideration for those assets; therefore, every liquidating distribution to share-
holders is fraudulent as to creditors, which includes creditors with contingent or unliquidated
claims. Transfers are not fraudulent under § 4, however, as to future creditors. Whether
claimants with post-dissolution claims are fraudulent under § 4 should depend on whether
those claims are characterized as contingent claims or only as future claims. Although trans-
fers are not fraudulent as to claimants with future claims under § 4, liquidating distributions
to shareholders may be fraudulent even as to claimants with future claims under §§ 6 or 7 of
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Dictum in Menconi v. Davison, 80 Ill. App. 2d 1,
225 N.E.2d 139 (1967), suggested that a post-dissolution claimant could recover from recipi-
ent shareholders upon proof of actual fraud. This dictum is consistent with the characteriza-
tion of post-dissolution claims as future rather than contingent claims, because actual fraud
is relevant to whether transfers are fraudulent under § 7, which renders transfers fraudulent
as to creditors with future claims. Actual fraud is irrelevant under § 4, which renders transfers
fraudulent as to creditors with contingent claims but not as to future creditors. Although
Illinois is not one of the twenty-eight states having adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act, the common law fraudulent conveyance treatment of the Illinois cases is analogous
to the results that would obtain under the Uniform Act.
119. 30 Ill. 2d 486, 197 N.E.2d 30 (1964).
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property taxes. ' Some of that interest accrued after dissolution of
the corporation, and the claim for that portion of the interest can
be characterized as a post-dissolution claim. As in previous cases
that excepted certain causes of action from the bar imposed by
expiration of the survival period, predissolution and post-
dissolution claims were not distinguished. 2 '
Defendant director in Parker argued that the cause of action
was barred by the survival statute. The claimant, the State of illi-
nois, argued that the survival statute did not preclude the suit be-
cause the liability the State sought to impose upon the former direc-
tor was created by section 42(f) of the Business Corporation Act.'2
Dissolution under section 42 is a two-step process. First, the corpo-
ration must file an intent to dissolve and mail notice of this intent
to all of the corporation's known creditors. The notice is intended
to facilitate the winding-up of the corporation's affairs, which in-
cludes payment of outstanding claims and liquidation. When the
corporation has completed the winding-up, it may file its articles of
dissolution-the final act in the dissolution process. Section 42(f)
imposes personal liability on the directors of a corporation that fails
to mail notice to a known creditor. In Parker, the dissolved corpora-
tion failed to mail notice of its intent to dissolve to the county
treasurer for the county that had assessed the personal property tax.
The suit brought by the State against the former director was predi-
cated upon the section 42(f) liability of that former director. The
narrow holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in Parker was that
expiration of the survival period does not bar recovery under section
42(f) by a known claimant to whom no notice of intent to dissolve
has been given.
This narrow holding represents sound policy. The notice provi-
sion has been proposed as a prerequisite to relieving shareholders
and directors of their common law liabilities upon expiration of the
statutory survival period."' The bar created by expiration of the
survival period was not intended to provide irresponsible entrepre-
neurs with a means for escaping liability. The possibility that share-
holders and directors might covertly dissolve their corporations and
120. Id. at 491, 197 N.E.2d at 32.
121. Id. ("If the plaintiff was entitled to recover interest. . . from the corporation,.
we can perceive no reason why this item . . . is not recoverable [in this case] . . . ."); see
text accompanying notes 100-02 & 110-12 supra. But see text accompanying notes 62-63, 103,
& 113 supra.
122. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42(f) (1953) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
32, § 157.42-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978)); see MODEL AcT, supra note 6, § 48.
123. Schoone, supra note 36, at 429.
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rely upon the survival statute bar to insulate them from the claims
of known creditors is clearly undesirable. Furthermore, giving prior-
ity to the policy underlying section 42(f) is not inconsistent with the
survival statute's policy of providing shareholders and directors
with a certain and definite point at which their liabilities end, be-
cause any uncertainty created by giving priority to section 42(f) will
be caused by the willful or negligent act of the directors upon whom
the section 42(f) liability is imposed.124
(5) Precedent Rejecting the General Rule
The Parker court did not undertake the policy analysis dis-
cussed above. Instead, by offering a different rationale for imposing
liability, the court created the much broader holding that the sur-
vival statute does not affect suits that did not abate at common law.
The broader holding was then used by the Seventh Circuit in
Palakow to form its second alternative holding that suits against
directors in their corporate capacity did not abate at common law
and therefore are unaffected by the survival statute.2' Parker was
the only Illinois case cited in Palakow to support the conclusion that
the Illinois survival statute affects only actions that abated at com-
mon law. The Parker court's rationale and the availability of that
rationale to support the second holding of Palakow are evident in
the following statement of the Parker court's test for application of
the statute:
Unless the liability imposed upon corporate directors by section 42(f) abates
upon dissolution of the corporation involved, section 94 [the survival statute]
has no application. Defendant offers no authority for the necessary premise
that dissolution of a corporation abates liability incurred by its directors, and
we do not know of any principle that requires that result.'1
2
The broader holding created by use of the Parker test, quite unlike
the narrow holding, rejects, rather than creates an exception to, the
postulated general rule of no shareholder or director liability follow-
ing expiration of the survival period. The narrow holding of Parker
is that director liability under section 42(f) is not barred by expira-
tion of the survival period; other shareholder and director liabilities
are outside the scope of the Parker decision. The test enunciated in
Parker, on the other hand, nullifies the postulated general rule by
producing a holding far broader than was required to support the
124. Both section 42(f) and the survival statute originally were adopted on July 13,
1933. See 1933 Ill. Laws §§ 42(f), 94.
125. 438 F.2d at 1179. See also text accompanying note 73 supra.
126. 30 Ill. 2d at 490, 197 N.E.2d at 31-32.
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actual result in Parker. Because no actions against former share-
holders and directors abated at common law, all actions against
former shareholders and directors are unaffected by the survival
statute's bar.
That the holding is broader than was intended by the Parker
court is evidenced by the context in which the test was stated and
by the decisions relied upon by the court. The three cases cited by
the Parker court in arriving at its test were all cases addressing
directors' and shareholders' liabilities that were created by stat-
ute.'1 The reliance upon these cases suggests that what the court
intended was an exception to the postulated general rule either for
certain specific statutory causes of action or for statutorily created
causes of action in general.1 8 Whether the Parker court intended the
broader holding that can be derived by application of the abatement
test to all causes of action is unclear. Certainly, the test was phrased
broadly enough to justify its use in Palakow to permit maintenance
of a nonstatutory cause of action brought after the survival period
expired.29
127. In one of the cases, Dukes v. Harrison & Reidy, 270 Ill. App. 372 (1933), discussed
in Schoone, supra note 36, at 423-24, a suit against shareholders following expiration of the
survival period was dismissed because the statute imposing the shareholder liability required
joinder of the dissolved corporation as a necessary party, and the dissolved corporation could
not be joined because of the survival statute's bar. But cf. Laning v. National Ribbon &
Carbon Paper Mfg. Co., 40 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. 11l. 1941) (those who received the property
of the dissolved corporation were necessary parties in lieu of the dissolved corporation that
was no longer subject to suit) (dictum). The Parker court cited Dukes for the unsupported
proposition that the Dukes decision "assumed that statutory liability of a stockholder for
unpaid stock subscription survives dissolution of the corporation." 30 Ill. 2d at 490, 197
N.E.2d at 32.
The Parker court quoted language from Consolidated Coal Co. v. Flynn Coal Co., 274
Ill. App. 405 (1934), but its reliance upon that case was clearly misplaced. The court in Flynn
Coal Co. considered the effect of the Illinois survival statute upon two types of claims against
former directors of a dissolved corporation. The plaintiff's first claim was that the directors
had "assented to an indebtedness in excess of the capital stock of the corporation, and
therefore are personally and individually liable to the extent of such excess, according to
section 23 of the Corporation Act . . . ." Id. at 408. The second claim was "[tlhat the
fraudulent conversion, or the fraudulent conduct of the defendants in the transfer of the
corporation property existed separate and independent of the Corporation Act, and that its
action was not controlled by" the survival statute. 274 Ill. App. at 410. For the text of the
survival statute then in existence, see 274 Ill. App. at 409-10. The Flynn Coal Co. court held
that the bar imposed by expiration of the survival period "applies to the remedy to enforce
statutory liabilities." Id. at 412. On that basis, the court sustained the dismissal of the
statutory claim against the former director. Id. at 411-12. The court, however, declined to
decide whether the claim of fraudulent concealment and conversion of corporate property was
barred by expiration of the survival period, because the claim could be and was adequately
disposed of on another ground-the five year statute of limitations for bringing the cause of
action had expired. Id. at 412-13. The third of the three cases cited by Parker was Galter v.
FTC, 186 F.2d 810 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 818 (1951).
128. See also note 91 supra.
129. 438 F.2d at 1179.
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(6) Precedent Supporting the General Rule
Since the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Palakow, the only
Illinois case directly on point casts serious doubt upon the accuracy
of the Palakow assessment of Illinois law. That case, Koepke v. First
National Bank, I took a plain meaning approach to the language of
the survival statute. The crux of the Illinois appellate court's one
page opinion is that "[tihe provisions of the [survival] statute are
clearly applicable, 1) to the defunct corporation, to its directors and
shareholders (see, Gordon v. Loew's Incorporated (D.C.N.J. 1956)),
147 F. Supp. 398, and 2) to 'any remedy,' which would include an
action brought in equity.' 31 Although the opinion seems to recog-
nize no exceptions to the bar of the survival statute, it does not
expressly repudiate the theory that there is a general rule of bar
coupled with a few well-defined exceptions. Certainly this holding
conflicts with the second holding of Palakow, which proposes that
all actions brought in equity are outside the scope of the survival
statute and its bar.
Moreover, Koepke and the second holding of Palakow cannot
be satisfactorily distinguished. While the claimant in Palakow, as
in Parker, sought a remedy "against . . . [the dissolved corpora-
tion], its directors, officers, or shareholders," the claimant in
Koepke sought a remedy "available to. . . [the dissolved corpora-
tion], its directors, officers, or shareholders."' 3 - In Koepke, the ma-
jority shareholder of the dissolved corporation brought an action in
equity on behalf of all the shareholders against a third party for
breach of a contract entered into with the dissolved corporation.
Although plaintiff alleged only financial injury as the basis for equi-
table relief, defendant did not attack the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. Defendant argued instead, and the court
held, that the survival statute's bar applied to equitable remedies
just as it applied to all others. In Palakow, on the other hand, the
bar of the survival statute was asserted not by a third party but by
former directors of the dissolved corporation to defeat the claim of
a third party.' An argument can be constructed that, although the
survival statute should bar actions by shareholders and directors for
130. 5 I1. App. 3d 799, 284 N.E.2d 671 (1972).
131. Id. at 800, 284 N.E.2d at 672.
132. MODEL Acr, supra note 6, § 105 (emphasis added); see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §
157.94 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.787 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
133. That the third party in Palakow was actually a shareholder of the dissolved corpo-
ration is immaterial. See text accompanying note 69 supra. In Parker, the third party against




remedies available to the dissolved corporation because they had
ample opportunity to seek those remedies, and because they had
some control over the decision to dissolve, the survival statute
should not bar actions by third parties because they should not be
prejudiced by a corporate dissolution over which they had no con-
trol.
The distinction between remedies available to and remedies
available against the dissolved corporation, its directors, and its
shareholders is an uneasy one. The language of the survival statute
makes no such distinction. Both the "prior to . . . dissolution"
language and the two-year limitation on survival apply equally to
remedies "available to" and to remedies "available . . against."
Furthermore, the courts have not made the distinction. The only
case cited by the Koepke court, Gordon v. Loew's Inc.,'34 clearly
rejects this distinction. The Gordon court, after reviewing the cases
and the legislative history, reached the following conclusion:
In. 1941 Section 94 [the Illinois survival statute] of the 1933 Act was
amended to ... [substitute] the phrase "remedy available to or against such
corporation, its directors, or shareholders" for the phrase "remedy given
against such corporation, its officers, or stockholders."
. . *It seems obvious that the 1941 amendment merely included remedies
available to the corporation, its directors and shareholders, with the remedies
given against the corporation, its officers or stockholders, and made no change
in the requirement for the commencement of suit within two years after
dissolution. '5
Other cases have not been so explicit, but they similarly have made
no distinction between cases in which the bar was imposed against
a third party and cases in which the bar was imposed against dis-
solved corporations, shareholders, and directors. 3 '
(7) General Rule or No General Rule: An
Unsatisfactory Conclusion
Because Koephe and the second holding in Palakow cannot be
reconciled or satisfactorily distinguished, the question is which case
134. 147 F. Supp. 398 (D.N.J. 1956), affl'd, 247 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1957). For further
discussion, see the text accompanying notes 41-48 supra.
135. 147 F. Supp. at 405-07 (emphasis in original).
136. Compare Levy v. Liebling, 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936
(1957) with Gordon v. Loew's Inc., 147 F. Supp. 398 (D.N.J. 1956), affl'd, 247 F.2d 451 (3d
Cir. 1957). Levy and Gordon reached opposite results in cases with similar facts and similar
causes of action based upon claims available to shareholders. Compare United States v.
Palakow, 438 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1971) with Brooks v. Saloy, 334 Ill. App. 93, 79 N.E.2d 97
(1948). Palakow and Brooks reached identical results even though one involved an action
against directors and the other involved an action upon a claim available to shareholders.
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is correct. The unfortunate answer is that both are, since precedent
exists to support the result in each case. The holding in Koepke, like
the second holding of Palakow, is stated too broadly. The court in
each case apparently determined the result it wanted to reach and
then found precedent from which to construct a rule, as in Koepke,
or a test, as in Palakow, to justify the desired result. The broadly
stated rule and test then became precedent for future litigants and
courts. Because both the rule and the test are stated too broadly,
they lead to results that not only are inconsistent but also have little
or no justification when measured against the real concerns of the
court that originally enunciated the rule or the test.
This unfortunate state of precedent allows litigants to pick and
choose standards according to the result they wish to achieve. No
further attempt will be made to harmonize the cases previously
discussed by analyzing what the courts said they were doing. Even
though there may be a general rule that expiration of the survival
period bars actions by or against dissolved corporations, their direc-
tors, or their shareholders, the exceptions to the general rule are so
numerous and so broad that they consume the rule itself. Many
courts apparently assume the existence of the postulated general
rule, but few have been willing to abide by that general rule when
deciding the case before them. There are two possible causes for this
confused state of precedent: (1) either the courts do not understand
the policies and goals of the survival statute, or (2) the courts disa-
gree as to the weight those policies and goals should be given when
set against countervailing policies or goals. The following section of
this Article attempts to explain the cases previously discussed in
light of the policies that should be given effect.
IV. WHAT COURTS Do AND WHY: PREDICTING WHETHER A CLAIM IS
BARRED BY ExpIRATION OF THE SURVIVAL PERIOD
137
That the survival statute has an uncertain effect upon various
categories of claims has been stated repeatedly. 13 The following
137. This section of the Article undertakes a task best described in Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924):
In making our observations we shall, however, find it necessary to focus our attention
upon what courts have done, rather than upon the description they have given of the
reasons for their action. Whatever generalizations we reach will therefore purport to be
nothing more than an attempt to describe in as simple a way as possible the concrete
judicial phenomena observed ....
Id. at 460 (emphasis in original).
138. E.g., Schoone, supra note 36, at 427; Wallach, supra note 23, at 334-35. The most
eloquent phrasing of the uncertainty is that in Henn & Alexander, supra note 10, at 916,
quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY or MACBET-, Act III, scene ii: "Absent statutory
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statement of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit evidences the experience of many courts that essential ques-
tions have been left unanswered: "[Tihe right to maintain a prod-
ucts liability suit against a dissolved corporation, in process of liqui-
dation under statutory authority, for post-dissolution-accrued
claims has received at best limited judicial or textbook considera-
tion."'3 Although the Fourth Circuit was addressing the Delaware
rather than the Model Act provisions, the court's feeling that it had
been left to wander in the dark typifies the feeling that many courts
must share.
A. Policy Goals Underlying the Survival Statute
If the courts are confused about the effect of the survival statute
upon actions by and against shareholders and directors, their confu-
sion is justified. At common law, all actions and claims by and
against corporations abated upon dissolution. The language of the
survival statute suggests that the statute's sole purpose is to post-
pone the abatement for two years following dissolution. When the
plaintiff or defendant in the suit is the dissolved corporation itself,
the language of the survival statute has worked well. The courts
have held consistently that suits by and against corporations can be
maintained during the two-year survival period, but not thereafter,
because no other statute postpones abatement. Similarly, the courts
have held consistently that only predissolution claims support ac-
tions by and against dissolved corporations directly, because the
survival statute, which is the only source for continued existence of
dissolved corporations, continues such corporations only for the pur-
pose of actions based upon claims arising "prior to .. .dissolu-
tion.""4 The common law rule of abatement, rather than the sur-
vival statute, effected the bar to post-dissolution actions. This in-
sight helps to identify the primary policy goal of the survival stat-
ute: by postponing abatement for two years, the survival statute
aimed to protect certain claimants against dissolved corporations
and to protect dissolved corporations with claims, but the protec-
tion was limited. It extended only to predissolution claims brought
within two years of dissolution.
resolution, shareholders about to vote for dissolution with a view toward their eventual receipt
of liquidation distributions might well join in Lady Macbeth's lament:"
'Tis safer to be that which we destroy
Than by destruction dwell in doubtful joy.
139. Johnson v. RAC Corp., 491 F.2d 510, 514 (4th Cir. 1974).
140. See, e.g., text accompanying note 61 supra.
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The drafters and enactors of the Model Act survival statute
apparently sought to achieve another policy goal as well. The policy
goal was best phrased by the Bishop court:'"
[Ilt seems highly untenable that the legislative intent manifest in the inclu-
sion of the last paragraph was such as to allow indefinite continued subjection
of the corporation and its officers and directors to litigation . . . . There
should be a definite point in time at which the existence of a corporation and
the transaction of its business are terminated. To allow, as the plaintiff con-
tends, the continued prosecution of lawsuits perverts the definiteness and
orderly process of dissolution so as to produce a continuous dribble of business
activity contrary to the intent of the . . . statute.'
This policy goal-certainty and definiteness for the corporation, its
shareholders, and its directors-also underlies the continued vital-
ity of the common law rule of abatement. The survival statute,
however, achieves its primary goal of protecting certain claims by
postponing the certainty and definiteness for a reasonable period to
allow the bringing of protected claims. The essential questions that
have received no satisfactory treatment are whether and to what
extent the survival statute itself furthers certainty and definiteness,
and how that policy goal should be balanced against the goal of
protecting claims. Certainty and definiteness for dissolved corpora-
tions are ensured by the rule of abatement, which operates automat-
ically when the survival statute's protection ceases or fails to apply.
On the other hand, certainty and definiteness for the shareholders
and directors of dissolved corporations are not ensured by the rule
of abatement because theories were developed in equity to allow
recovery against shareholders and directors for claims that would
have been maintained against the corporation but for its dissolu-
tion. That the equitable theories had the same policy goal as one of
the original primary policy goals of the survival statute-the protec-
tion of claimants against the dissolved corporation-led some to
conclude that the survival statute was intended to replace the equi-
table theories of recovery.'
The language of the survival statute indicates that legislatures
intended to substitute the survival statute for the equitable theories
as the exclusive mechanism for protecting claimants against dis-
141. The Bishop court was interpreting IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.102 (West 1962). The
Iowa legislature adopted the Model Act provision basically intact but supplemented that
provision as follows: "A corporation which has been dissolved or the period of duration of
which has expired by limitation or otherwise, may nevertheless continue to act for the purpose
of conveying title to its property, real and personal, and otherwise winding up its affairs."
142. 293 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa 1968) (emphasis added). For further discussion,
see notes 55-60 supra.
143. See notes 74-79 supra and accompanying text.
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solved corporations. By its own terms the survival statute applies
to remedies whether available to or against the dissolved corpora-
tion, its shareholders, or its directors. Because remedies against
shareholders and directors did not abate upon dissolution, however,
no need exists to continue those remedies. Those remedies were not
available at common law until dissolution. The wording of the sur-
vival statute that "dissolution. . . shall not take away or impair
any remedy" works well when applied to a remedy that would be
impaired absent the statute. The courts understandably have been
confused, however, when confronted with remedies that were not
impaired at common law-the trust fund remedies. This confusion
is evident in the Palakow and Koepke decisions. The second holding
of Palakow, that the survival statute does not affect claims that did
not abate at common law, is not incorrect because the survival
statute purports only to continue causes of action, not to bar them.
On the other hand, Koepke is not incorrect because the survival
statute applies to shareholders and directors as well as to dissolved
corporations, and no apparent reason exists for including sharehold-
ers and directors within the survival statute unless the bar was
meant to limit the time for bringing actions by and against share-
holders and directors. Palakow furthers one of the policy goals of the
survival statute and the policy goal of the equitable theories of
recovery-protection of claimants against dissolved corpora-
tions-at the expense of the secondary policy goal of the survival
statute and the policy goal of the common law rule of abate-
ment-certainty and definiteness. The broadly phrased holding of
Koepke, on the other hand, furthers certainty and definiteness at
the expense of protecting claimants and corporations with claims.
That the drafters and enactors of the survival statute intended
to further the purpose of securing certainty and definiteness for
shareholders and directors also is indicated by the relationship of
the survival statute to other provisions of the Model Act.144 These
other provisions form the two-step dissolution process, which has
been adopted in various forms by most states having survival stat-
utes.' The first step of dissolution is the filing of a statement of
intent to dissolve with the appropriate state official, who by record-
ing the statement makes it a public record. The world is on notice
following the recordation, but many statutes require that the corpo-
144. See MODEL Acr, supra note 6, § § 85-87, 92-93.
145. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. 2d § 105 3 Statutory Provisions (ABA 1971
& Supp. 1977) with MODEL AcT, supra note 6, §§ 85-87, 92-93 3 Statutory Provisions. See
generally Schoone, supra note 36, at 421 nn.47-55, 422 nn.56-77.
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ration give additional and more direct notice to its known creditors.
The second step of the dissolution process is the filing of the articles
of dissolution. The corporation may take this second step only after
it (1) protects any claimants with suits pending by making provision
for satisfying any judgment that might be rendered against the
corporation, (2) pays or makes provision for paying the creditors of
the corporation, and (3) distributes to the shareholders the remain-
ing assets of the corporation."' In other words, under two-step disso-
lution, liquidation occurs between the giving of constructive or ac-
tual notice of intent to dissolve and the final dissolution of the
corporation. The first step terminates the corporation's existence for
purposes other than winding-up its affairs,'47 and the second step
terminates its existence for all purposes "except for the purpose of
suits, other proceedings and appropriate corporate action by share-
holders, directors and officers as provided in this Act."' The quoted
phrase acknowledges that the survival statute continues the exist-
ence of the finally dissolved corporation for the limited purpose of
allowing remedies for any claim existing "prior to. . .dissolution"
if suit is filed thereon within the survival period.4 9
Whether the survival statute is needed to protect claimants
against dissolved corporations is questionable in light of the protec-
tion already afforded by the two-step dissolution procedure. Under
two-step dissolution, a corporation cannot file articles of dissolution
unless it makes affirmative representations that creditors have been
satisfied and that the corporation has made provision for satisfying
claimants with pending suits. Thus, in states having two-step disso-
lution, and in some states having one-step dissolution, '5 legislatures
apparently contemplated that claimants against the corporation
would be protected by steps taken before dissolution. If legislatures
intended the survival statute to protect any claimants against the
corporation, they are claimants with predissolution claims who first
take action on those claims following final dissolution. Thus, with
all known creditors and all but a small class of claimants protected
by the two-step dissolution process, little weight can be given to the
survival statute's original policy goal of protecting claimants
against the dissolved corporation. Also weakened is the other origi-
146. MODEL AcT, supra note 6, § 92.
147. Id. § 86.
148. Id. § 93.
149. But cf. Schoone, supra note 36, at 422 ("The intention of the draftsmen apparently
was to place the limitation, not on the corporation's existence, but on the cause of action.").




nal policy goal of the survival statute-protecting dissolved corpora-
tions, shareholders, and directors with claims against third par-
ties-because two-step dissolution contemplates that such claims
will be brought during the winding-up period prior to final dissolu-
tion. The weakness of these two original policy goals is demon-
strated most strikingly in those states where the survival statute
existed prior to the two-step dissolution procedure.' 5 The survival
statute in those states provided the dissolved corporation with a
period within which to wind up its affairs, thus eliminating the
harsh results of abatement that accompanied the formal cessation
of business. When the two-step dissolution procedure was adopted
in those states, corporations could cease their business operations
and then wind up before final dissolution and the consequent abate-
ment. That legislatures enacted two-step dissolution procedures to
further the policy goal of protecting claims by and against dissolved
corporations makes retention of the survival statute the best evi-
dence that certainty and definiteness for shareholders and directors
was intended as an important secondary policy goal of the survival
statute.
B. The Cases Reinterpreted in Light of the Policy Goals: What
Courts Do Rather Than What Courts Say
The survival statute protects claims by and against dissolved
corporations by authorizing the bringing of certain actions for a
reasonable period following dissolution. In some states, the reasona-
ble period is two years, in others three or more.' - The common
thread among the individual/corporate capacity test, the abate-
ment/nonabatement test, and every other exception to the postu-
lated general rule barring actions after the survival period is that
any court applying the tests or creating an exception considered the
survival period an unreasonable period within which to require the
bringing of the particular case before the court. Conversely, in cases
such as Koepke the two-year period was considered reasonable.
In Koepke a majority shareholder brought suit against a party
who breached a contract with the dissolved corporation. Although
the cause of action was theoretically an action in equity to recover
for financial injury, the court was unimpressed with the equitable
nature of the claim but did not phrase its holding on that basis.'53
Possibly the crucial, unstated factor in Koepke was that the cause
151. See Schoone, supra note 36, at 420-23.
152. See note 30 supra.
153. 5 Il. App. 3d at 799-800, 284 N.E.2d at 672.
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of action for breach of contract was of a type that the dissolved
corporation should have maintained itself. The two years allowed by
the survival statute thus were considered an additional period for
bringing such causes of action by dissolved corporations. Moreover,
courts generally have not been reluctant to require dissolved corpo-
rations to bring suit within the two-year period, since this period is
an extension of time beyond that traditionally afforded by the com-
mon law rule of abatement.
The Brooks court,'54 similarly addressing an action by former
shareholders based upon a claim available to the corporation before
dissolution, reached the opposite result. In Brooks the court relied
upon the individual/corporate capacity distinction to permit an
equitable action following expiration of the survival period.
Whether the court properly applied the individual/corporate capac-
ity test and whether the cause of action was actually one that would
have abated at common law are less important than the court's
obvious intent to achieve its result. The court may have felt that the
two-year period was an unreasonably short period within which to
require the bringing of the action. Plaintiff shareholders, according
to the court, owned the land in question as tenants in common,
having become tenants in common automatically upon dissolution
of their corporation. The court took jurisdiction to allow the share-
holders to exercise their right of redemption, to remove a cloud on
title, and to partition the land. 55 This relief, especially the removal
of a cloud on title, is a type that courts understandably are reluctant
to limit by imposing a short period within which to bring the ac-
tion.' 5' For example, one state has recognized the distinction be-
tween quiet title actions and all other actions by providing in its
survival statute for the indefinite survival of the corporation for
suits against it to quiet title.' 5 The title to land requires and de-
serves judicial attention because uncertainty of title may reduce the
value and the productivity of land. Purchasers may be reluctant to
make valuable improvements on land to which the title is unclear.
Consequently, courts would injure society if they did not judicially
clarify title to land whenever possible. This is not to say that the
removal of the cloud on title in Brooks should not have been under-
taken by the corporation before dissolution or during the survival
period. Instead, the point is that a court is unlikely to reject causes
154. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
155. 334 I1. App. at 102, 79 N.E.2d at 101.
156. A similar concern led to one of the clearest exceptions to the survival period
bar-the exception for actions to foreclose mortgages. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
157. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(c) (West 1977).
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of action to remove a cloud on title without clear and express legisla-
tive intent to limit these causes of action to a definite period. That
the legislative intent is unclear regarding the policy goal of certainty
and definiteness for shareholders and directors has been demon-
strated.
Assuming that the underlying concern of those courts that have
found exceptions to the postulated general rule is the unreasona-
bleness of the duration of the survival period, the essential question
is what factors might lead a court to conclude that the survival
period is unreasonable. Self-dealing is a characteristic of several
cases in which courts allowed causes of action against shareholders
and directors following expiration of the survival period.'58 Self-
dealing shareholders and directors are likely to be held liable to
those they defraud or mislead whether the court justifies allowing
the cause of action with the theory that the cause of action is against
the perpetrators individually rather than in their corporate capaci-
ties,'59 or whether the court finds a fraudulent conveyance and ig-
nores the dissolution, relying solely upon the fraudulent transfers
that may take the form of liquidating distributions. 0 Because the
public has a strong interest in preventing self-dealing, it is easy to
understand why courts are reluctant to disallow causes of action in
these cases. The countervailing interest in certainty and definite-
ness for shareholders and directors is outweighed by the public in-
terest in imposing liability for self-dealing. As with the interest in
securing judicial clarification of title to land, the interest in dissuad-
ing self-dealing will not be overcome by less than clear legislative
intent to subordinate that interest to the policy goal of providing
certainty and definiteness for shareholders and directors.
Although self-dealing is a significant factor that may justify
allowing a claim brought after the survival period expires, courts
may be equally influenced by other considerations, as the Parker
case makes clear.'8 ' Although self-dealing arguably was present in
Parker, the court also contemplated an additional problem-the
date the claim arose. The court prefaced its analysis of this issue by
stating that "[iut would be anomalous that the occasion giving rise
to the liability, dissolution of the corporation, would also cause it
to abate.'1 2 If a claim arises because of the dissolution process
itself, it may be unreasonable to allow the claimant only a two-year
158. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
159. Id.
160. See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
161. For a discussion of Parker, see text accompanying notes 119-29 supra.
162. 30 I1. 2d at 490, 197 N.E.2d at 32; see text accompanying note 39 supra.
1406 [Vol. 31:1363
POST-DISSOLUTION LIABILITIES
period within which to take action. This is especially true when, as
in Parker and Palakow, the claimant is a governmental entity that
customarily does not bring actions within such a short period. In
Parker the cause of action was filed in 1961 for taxes assessed in 1953
and 1954. Undoubtedly, the state's attorney brought suit just prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations for collecting the
taxes-a routine practice consistent with the common government
policy of giving taxpayers every possible chance to pay taxes volun-
tarily. This prevalent practice is fair to the taxpayer and less costly
to the government because fewer suits will have to be brought if
taxpayers are given more time to pay. Furthermore, the administra-
tive cost of checking each corporate taxpayer for a possible dissolu-
tion might be overly burdensome.
Thus, when the survival period expires before the state rou-
tinely files suit, the two-year period imposed by the survival statute
arguably is unreasonable-the administrative cost of bringing suit
within the survival period against those dissolved corporations that
fail to give the statutory notice is too great to justify imposition
upon the taxpaying public. The unreasonableness is more severe
when the sole purpose of allowing suit is to assure certainty of liabil-
ity to a director who, if not a self-dealing party, at least was negli-
gent. For example, although in Palakow the directors should have
made distributions in liquidation to the Small Business Administra-
tion (SBA) as a shareholder of the dissolving corporation, the direc-
tors dissolved the corporation without any notice to the SBA. A two-
year period within which to bring an action is unreasonable, espe-
cially when parties owing the claimant a fiduciary duty have dis-
solved the corporation by covert action that not only brought about
the claim but also started the two-year period running without any
notice to the shareholder claimant.
The three factors discussed above were present in Palakow: (1)
self-dealing, (2) a claim that arose at a late date and was brought
about by the dissolution itself, and (3) no notice of the running of
the survival period when such notice should have been provided by
the defendant who had a fiduciary duty, or as in Parker, a statutory
duty, to provide or oversee that notice. Whether any or all of these
factors must be present before a court will apply the Palakow indi-
vidual/corporate capacity test or the abatement/nonabatement test
that ultimately could justify allowing a claim brought after the
survival period expired is open to question. It is also unclear what
interests identified with these factors will outweigh the policy goal
of certainty and definiteness for shareholders and directors. It is
doubtful, however, that either of the two tests from Palakow would
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be applied if none of the factors or interests described above were
present.
C. Predicting Success of Tort and Breach of Warranty Claims
Among the post-dissolution claims addressed in this Article are
tort claims and breach of warranty claims that would have been
brought directly against the corporation but for its liquidation and
dissolution. Claims upon which suits are pending on the date of final
dissolution are outside the scope of this discussion because in two-
step dissolution states a corporation must provide for those claims
prior to filing of the articles of dissolution.1 3 Even in states where
provision for such claims is not required, those claims can be satis-
fied, and if not, at least the amount of those claims and the share-
holders' and directors' exposure for them can be estimated readily
and taken into account by the shareholders and directors in decid-
ing whether to vote for dissolution. Thus, the shareholders' and
directors' liabilities under consideration in this subsection are liabil-
ities for tort claims or breach of warranty claims against the dis-
solved corporation that are unknown until after dissolution. These
claims will be either post-dissolution claims or predissolution claims
upon which no action is brought until after dissolution.
Under the individual/corporate capacity test' 4 and the abate-
ment/nonabatement test, the contemplated claims could be main-
163. See, e.g., MODEL ACr, supra note 6, § 92.
164. The test ultimately distinguished those causes of action against shareholders and
directors that abate at common law from those that do not. In Palakow an equitable action
that did not abate was held to state a cause of action against the defendant individually. The
ultimate result of labelling such actions to be actions against defendants individually and the
result that makes the first and second holdings of Palakow consistent is that only actions
joining the directors or the shareholders in their capacities as trustees of the corporation's
assets are subject to the survival statute. This reduces the inclusion of shareholders and
directors within the survival statute to mean in part that actions against dissolved corpora-
tions directly, which name the directors or shareholders as trustees, similar to actions naming
as defendants the administrator or executor of a decedent's estate, are subject to the survival
statute and its bar. See note 71 supra. With respect to actions brought by shareholders and
directors, under this analysis the survival statute applies only to actions brought by share-
holders and directors on behalf of the dissolved corporation. For example, shareholders'
derivative suits would be barred by the survival statute if those suits were based upon post-
dissolution claims or if the survival period had expired prior to the filing of the suits. Suits
predicated upon a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the shareholder individually, however,
would be unaffected by the survival statute, as indeed was the case in Palakow, in which the
shareholder's action, which was filed following expiration of the survival period, was not even
questioned upon the ground that the bar of the survival statute applies to remedies available
to shareholders. 438 F.2d at 1179. Thus, the individual/corporate capacity test from the first
holding in Palakow, when taken to its ultimate conclusion without any additional require-
ment of self-dealing, produces the same result as the abatement/nonabatement test of the
second holding in Palakow.
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tained against the directors or shareholders at any time because the
survival statute would have no effect on causes of action based upon
equitable theories. Because these two tests, like exceptions to the
postulated rule that the survival statute bars all claims after two
years, are used by courts only after those courts have decided that
the survival statute should not apply, it is necessary to determine
whether a court likely would consider the survival statute unreason-
able when applied to either post-dissolution claims or predissolution
claims upon which no causes of action are pending on the date of
dissolution. The examples that have been used before to demon-
strate the type of post-dissolution tort claims that are most likely
to lead to actions against shareholders and directors or dissolved
corporations are: (1) a claim that arises when a defective product
manufactured by the corporation before dissolution causes injury
after dissolution, and (2) a claim that arises when a foreign object
negligently inserted into a claimant's body by a corporation's medi-
cal employees is discovered after dissolution of that corporation. Are
any of the factors and interests that were present in Palakow present
in cases addressing these types of claims?
Neither the dissolving corporation nor the directors have any
statutory or common law fiduciary duty to notify those who have
potential post-dissolution tort claims. Moreover, the dissolving cor-
poration's statutory duty under two-step dissolution to notify poten-
tial claimants by filing for public record a notice of intent to dissolve
does not help contingent claimants whose claims do not arise until
after dissolution. Similarly, self-dealing is of no special concern in
cases addressing post-dissolution products liability or malpractice
claims. Although it might be argued that directors and shareholders
who liquidate and dissolve their corporations with reason to expect
future tort claims and who do not provide for satisfaction of the
claims have engaged in self-dealing, more direct self-dealing by
shareholders or directors apparently must be present to influence
courts.' The Model Act two-step dissolution requires only that the
corporation represent that it has provided for creditors and claim-
ants who have suits pending. 66 Courts probably will not view as self-
dealing the failure to provide for claimants excluded from statutory
protection.
Thus, cases addressing these types of post-dissolution claims
often lack two of the factors present in Palakow: (1) a defendant who
failed to give claimants notice of dissolution or of the running of the
165. See text accompanying notes 93-94 & 161 supra.
166. MODEL Acr, supra note 6, § 92.
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survival period although he had a duty to provide that notice, and
(2) a defendant who engaged in self-dealing. The same considera-
tions are lacking in cases involving predissolution tort and breach
of warranty claims upon which no suit has been filed on the date of
dissolution, except that the absence of notice element may be pres-
ent if notice of intent to dissolve is not filed in a state in which filing
gives constructive notice.
The only factor, common both to Palakow and to cases involv-
ing post-dissolution claims, that is relevant to the reasonableness of
limiting remedies against shareholders and directors to the survival
period is that the claim first arises at a late date. If post-dissolution
claims may be brought only during the survival period, as suggested
by the previously discussed Litts reading of Bishop,' 7 then the pe-
riod available for bringing an action on the claim would be a maxi-
mum of two years. Whether two years is a reasonable time within
which to bring a cause of action depends upon the length of the
statute of limitations for bringing the cause of action. If the statute
of limitations has expired, then the cause of action is barred; if not,
then the length of the survival period is likely to be unreasonable
because a claimant having no actual notice of the running of the
survival period will be unaware of the need for action prior to expira-
tion of the appropriate statute of limitations. Requiring individual
claimants to check immediately for corporate existence of their po-
tential defendants is unreasonable, just as it was in Parker for a
state claimant to whom notice should have been given. 8
An absolute bar to causes of action based upon post-dissolution
claims certainly is unreasonable.' 9 To alleviate this bar, the Levy
court interpreted the "prior to . . . dissolution" language of the
survival statute to mean that the survival statute does not apply to
post-dissolution claims. 7' The unreasonableness of precluding rem-
edies for claims from the time they first arise was an express concern
of the Levy court."' The Levy court interpreted the survival statute
so that a reasonable period for bringing causes of action on post-
dissolution claims would be available. By holding that the survival
statute does not affect post-dissolution claims, the Levy court effec-
tively decided that the survival period was an unreasonably short
period within which to require the bringing of actions based upon
167. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
168. See text accompanying note 162 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
170. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
171. See text accompanying note 39 supra. The same concern was expressed in Parker.
See text accompanying note 162 supra.
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post-dissolution claims, and that the survival statute should not be
construed so as to attribute unreasonableness to the drafters and
enactors of the survival statute without clear legislative intent to
accomplish this result.
The second category of claims upon which actions are likely to
be brought following expiration of the survival period are predissolu-
tion claims upon which no suit is pending on the date of dissolution.
Again, these are assumed to be suits filed after dissolution by breach
of warranty or tort claimants who do not qualify as known creditors
under the two-step dissolution provisions. 172 Claimants with predis-
solution claims, unlike those with post-dissolution claims, usually
will be afforded a reasonable length of time for bringing actions
upon their claims because in most instances the statute of limita-
tions on the predissolution tort claim will expire before expiration
of the survival period. 73 When that is not the case, as with breach
of warranty claims, the survival period may be an unreasonably
short period within which to require the filing of suit. Under Levy,
however, predissolution claims are subject to the survival statute.
In addition, predissolution claims clearly can be maintained against
the dissolved corporation, its shareholders, and its directors during
the survival period. Thus, although the survival period may be an
unreasonably short period within which to require the bringing of
an action upon a predissolution claim, the Levy rationale does not
support the exclusion of predissolution claims from application of
the survival statute. Furthermore, although an argument can be
made that Levy provides an adequate solution for treating post-
dissolution claims, permitting post-dissolution claims to be main-
tained as though there were no survival statute and no bar defeats
the policy goal of certainty and definiteness for former shareholders
and directors of dissolved corporations. Certainty and definiteness
should not be totally abandoned in favor of protecting claimants.
V. TOWARD JUDICIAL UNIFORMITY THROUGH STATUTORY REFORM
The examination of case law under section 105 has revealed
confusion in the courts about an area of law that deserves more
precision and certainty. Shareholders and directors, if they are to
172. See, e.g., MODEL ACr, supra note 6, § 92. Breach of warranty claims arise when
the defective product is sold, which usually occurs prior to dissolution. Post-dissolution
breach of warranty claims therefore will be rare. See note 23 supra.
173. Whereas the survival period in most states is two years or longer, the statute of
limitations in most states for causes of action based upon personal injuries caused by defec-
tive products is one year. Compare materials cited in note 30 supra with 53 C.J.S. Limitations
of Actions § 74 (1948).
19781 1411
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
plan for personal liabilities, must be able to predict their exposure
to liability.
In addition, for a corporation desiring to sell its assets and
subsequently dissolve and liquidate, the valuation of those assets
and the advisability of making the sale can be determined only if
the extent of post-dissolution liabilities is known. For any share-
holder who will receive a large share of the distributed assets, this
is an important consideration-one that should affect the vote of his
stock for or against the sale of assets and subsequent dissolution of
the corporation. Any shareholder of a corporation with contingent
malpractice or products liability claims should weigh carefully the
possibility that a claimant against the dissolved corporation may
trace and recover all or a large portion of what the shareholder can
expect to receive in distribution. This potential loss could make the
sale of assets very unattractive, especially if insurance, which cov-
ered the risk for the corporation, is unavailable to the shareholder.
Section 105 in its present form is outdated. Section 105 in-
creases the confusion among the courts, rather than reducing it.
Moreover, subsequently enacted provisions of the Model Act and
cases construing section 105 have frustrated its achievement of
many desirable policy goals. The proposed revision of section 105 set
forth below is designed to resolve current confusion by balancing for
both post-dissolution and predissolution claims the competing pol-
icy goals"' of protecting claimants and providing corporate and in-
dividual defendants with certainty and definiteness.
A. Proposed Section 105
TERMINATION OF REMEDIES UPON DISsOLUTION
Claims By and Against the Corporation
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance
of a certificate of dissolution, or (2) by a decree of court when
the court has not liquidated the assets and business of the corpo-
ration as provided in this Model Act, or (3) by expiration of its
period of duration shall terminate all remedies, claims, and
causes of action available to or against the corporation, unless a
legal action or proceeding thereon is commenced before a court
or tribunal of competent jurisdiction prior to such dissolution.
174. An alternative revision of section 105 was proposed in Henn & Alexander, supra
note 10, at 915-16. It can be compared profitably with the instant proposal. The Missouri
legislature took yet another approach to resolving some of the problems of the survival
statute. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.565 (Vernon 1966) (Notes of Decisions).
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, any remedy, claim, or cause of
action, whether arising before or after the dissolution of a corpo-
ration, that would have been available against the dissolved
corporation but for the dissolution may be pursued (1) directly
against any director or officer who is a trustee of the assets of
the dissolved corporation or, (2) if jurisdiction cannot be ob-
tained over any such director or officer, directly against any
shareholder; provided that no director, officer, or shareholder
shall be liable under the foregoing provisions, if the dissolved
corporation, prior to filing a statement of intent to dissolve,
acquired from a purchaser or transferee of substantially all the
assets of the dissolved corporation an express agreement to as-
sume liability for all remedies, claims, and causes of action that
would otherwise be available against the dissolved corporation
but for its dissolution.
Any director or officer shall be liable under the foregoing
paragraph, not personally but in a representative capacity, only
to the extent of the assets held by such director or officer on the
date that the director or officer received service of process or
other official notice that an action or proceeding has been
commenced naming him as a party. Any shareholder shall be
personally liable urider the foregoing paragraph, but only to
the extent of the fair market value of any assets received in dis-
tribution from the corporation, the fair market value of which
is to be determined as of the date of dissolution of the corpora-
tion. Any shareholder against whom a remedy, claim, or cause
of action shall be asserted under or pursuant to this paragraph
shall be entitled to contribution from any other shareholder to
whom assets were distributed.
Claims Against Officers, Directors, and Shareholders
Unless a legal action or proceeding thereon is commenced
before a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction within two
years after the date of dissolution of a corporation, all remedies,
claims, and causes of action based upon any act, omission, or
breach of duty of any officer, director, or shareholder in his
respective capacity as such shall continue to be available for a
period of two years following the date of dissolution and shall
terminate absolutely thereafter; provided, however, that noth-
ing in this paragraph shall terminate or limit any remedy, claim,
or cause of action:




(b) Under or pursuant to section 48(c) of this Act, or for any
right to contribution that any director liable under section 48(c)
of this Act may have; or
(c) Against any director by any shareholder of the dissolved
corporation, if the shareholder (1) had no actual knowledge of
the dissolution, (2) was given no notice of intent to dissolve, and
(3) received no distributions to which he was entitled by virtue
of the dissolution of the corporation.
General Exceptions
Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained
herein, the following remedies, claims, and causes of action shall
not terminate or be affected otherwise either by dissolution of a
corporation or by expiration of the two-year continuation period:
(a) Those to foreclose or enforce a lien, mortgage, security
interest, or other encumbrance to which the real or personal
property of the corporation was subject on the date of dissolu-
tion, against real or personal property;
(b) Those to clarify title to real or personal property (1) by
any officer or director holding such property as a trustee of the
assets of the corporation, or (2) by any shareholder to whom such
property has been distributed in liquidation of the corporation;
and
(c) Those by any officer or director as trustee of the assets
of the corporation or by distributee shareholders as a class to
collect a valid and final judgment obtained by the corporation
against a judgment debtor.
B. Comment on the Statutory Proposal
The drafters of the proposed section 105 have suggested a solu-
tion that balances the two competing goals under the survival stat-
ute-providing a certain and definite cut-off point for the bringing
of claims against officers, directors, and shareholders on the one
hand, and the protection of claimants, whether the corporation, its
officers, directors, or shareholders, or third parties suing those per-
sons, on the other. This balance is not provided by the present
survival statute, which by its express terms favors certainty and
definiteness at the expense of adequate protection for claimants.
Nor is the balance provided by courts applying section 105; the
courts have created broad exceptions that when carried to their
logical conclusions upset the balance in favor of the other ex-
treme-complete protection with no certainty and definiteness. In
order to assure that both policy goals are advanced, the proposed
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statute expressly incorporates a modified rule of abatement and
theories of recovery similar to the equitable theories.
Unlike the present survival statute that neither creates nor de-
stroys any cause of action, the proposed statute expressly creates
new causes of action with the intent to abolish the equitable theories
of recovery. The intent of the drafters is to abolish the use of any
trust fund theory, fraudulent conveyance theory, or piercing the veil
theory as a means of recovery against officers, directors, and share-
holders of dissolved corporations. Similarly, unlike the survival
statute that only postponed the common law rule of abatement, the
present statute abolishes the common law rule and substitutes a
modified version of that rule. The specific provisions of the proposed
section 105 are explained below.
(1) Claims By and Against the Corporation
This, the first of three divisions of the proposed section 105, is
a statutory replacement for both the common law rule of abatement
and the equitable theories of recovery. The first sentence is a modi-
fied rule of abatement that terminates all remedies, claims, and
causes of action that are not initiated by legal action prior to disso-
lution. No abatement occurs if a legal action or proceeding is com-
menced prior to dissolution because claimants with pending legal
actions or proceedings are protected by section 92 of the Model
Business Corporation Act, 75 one of the two-step dissolution provi-
sions. As a prerequisite to dissolution section 92 requires that cer-
tain corporate officers represent that the corporation has provided
for the satisfaction of potentially successful claimants with pending
legal actions or proceedings. Section 48(c), which imposes personal
liability on directors of any corporation that fails to satisfy the
claims of known creditors, should give claimants with pending legal
actions a source of recovery if the representations made by the offi-
cers as a prerequisite to final dissolution are false. 7 ' The proposed
section 105 does not continue the existence of a corporation beyond
dissolution because fictional continuation is no longer needed to
permit the winding-up of the corporation, which under two-step
dissolution occurs before final dissolution.
The first clause of the second sentence in paragraph one estab-
lishes new causes of action that abolish all other forms and theories
of recovery against officers, directors, or shareholders for remedies,
claims, and causes of action that would have been available directly
175. MoDEL AcT, supra note 6, § 92.
176. Id. § 48(c).
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against the corporation but for its dissolution. The theories abol-
ished include, but are not limited to, the trust fund theory as ap-
plied to shareholders, the fraudulent conveyance theory to the ex-
tent that it allowed recovery from recipient shareholders,'77 and
piercing the corporate veil theories used to reach assets in the hands
of recipient shareholders or parent corporations.'78
Under the statutory formulation, an officer or director may be
sued in his own name if, either by statute or common law of the local
jurisdiction, he is a liquidating trustee. This eliminates the need to
continue the dissolved corporation in order to allow suit in the cor-
porate name. The second paragraph provides that the liquidating
trustee is not liable personally for distributing the assets incorrectly,
as he would have been under the equitable trust fund theory.' 7' The
liquidating trustee is liable in a representative capacity only, and
his liability is limited to the value of any assets held by him on the
day he has actual notice of the suit against him. Thus, from the day
he has actual notice until judgment is satisfied, the liquidating
trustee owes the limited duty of not diminishing the value of those
assets. Although the maximum liability is the value of the assets on
the day of actual notice, the liability is not personal; thus the claim-
ant can seek to satisfy his judgment only from the assets held by
the trustee, except that if the trustee breaches his duty not to dimin-
ish the value of the assets, personal liability attaches for the prohib-
ited diminution. Furthermore, the claimant may not be able to
reach assets to which other creditors or claimants have prior or
equal claims. To protect the trustee in this situation, no personal
liability is imposed for proper division of the available assets to all
creditors and all claimants whose pending suits the liquidating trus-
tee has actual knowledge of on the date of distribution.
Under the two-step dissolution process, the liquidating trustee
should have no assets in his possession or under his control after the
date of dissolution. Thus, this liability will attach only under excep-
tional circumstances. It is not impossible, however, that a director
or officer will hold assets following dissolution. This provision is
designed to overrule the result in a reported case in which claimants
who filed suit after expiration of the survival period were denied
recovery even though the directors continued to hold and invest
assets in trust for shareholders following dissolution.' The liquidat-
177. See notes 10 & 116-18 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 104-09 & 112 supra.
179. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
180. Johnson v. Helicopter & Airplane Serv. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 726 (D. Md. 1975)
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ing trustee may also have assets in his possession when dissolution
occurs by a decree of court, as described in the first sentence of the
section, or by expiration of the duration of the corporation rather
than by voluntary dissolution pursuant to the two-step dissolution
provisions. The liability of officers and directors in a representative
capacity will be especially useful for such dissolutions.
The shareholder liability under the present statutory formula-
tion is personal, unlike the trust fund theory liability, which trav-
elled with the assets.'8 ' The shareholder is liable personally for the
value of what he received on the date of dissolution. What the share-
holder does with the assets is therefore irrelevant. This provision
eliminates both the possibility and the need for tracing assets into
the hands of certain transferees, as was required for recovery under
the equitable trust fund theory. 8 '
The liability provisions of the first and second paragraphs pro-
vide some protection for all claimants, whether their claims arise
before or after dissolution, if the claimants are entitled to recover
from assets held by the offending corporation when it ceased doing
business. If the corporation was insolvent, no liability arises. If,
however, the corporation had enough assets to make distributions
to the shareholders, then the liability does arise. Corporations that
are likely to make distributions substantial enough to warrant post-
dissolution suit are those that have sold virtually all their assets to
third parties. When a third party purchases a significant amount of
the operating assets of the dissolving corporation, the third party
transferee probably will use stock or cash to make the purchase.
When the transferee uses stock to make the acquisition, the transac-
tion, assuming it is not a statutory merger or consolidation, nor-
mally will be a de facto merger or will effect a continuation of the
transferor dissolving corporation.' The transferee corporation con-
sequently will be held liable for claims against the transferor corpo-
ration whether arising before or after dissolution. When the consid-
eration is cash rather than stock, transferees traditionally have not
been held liable. A trend has developed, however, that imposes
liability on cash purchasing transferees who continue to operate the
businesses of their transferors. 14
The proposed statute affects traditional notions in two respects.
(construing the Delaware survival provision, 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1975), which is
comparable to MODEL Acr § 105).
181. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
182. See note 12 supra.




First, many corporate transferees, by recognizing the present trend
toward transferee liability, might agree to assume the liability that
probably would be imposed even without such an agreement. If the
transferor corporation procures an express assumption of liability,
then the officers, directors, and shareholders of the transferor will
be released from all liability imposed by the first division of section
105. This release provision gives officers, directors, and shareholders
an opportunity to secure almost absolute certainty and definiteness
and, at the same time, it adequately protects claimants. The trans-
feree corporation will be in a good position to insure against the
claims assumed."" The adjustment in purchase price that a trans-
feree is likely to demand in exchange for assuming the contingent
claims should represent the actuarial cost of insuring against the
assumed claims. This is a cost that the transferor would have borne
had it continued in existence, and it is not unreasonable to require
that the transferor's distributee shareholders bear that cost before
terminating the transferor corporation's existence.
Second, the proposed statute makes it clear that, absent an
express assumption of liability by a transferee, the shareholders of
the dissolved transferor will be liable to claimants for the value of
stock received by them in a stock purchase of the assets. This liabil-
ity attaches notwithstanding the transferee liability that may exist
even without the express assumption of liability. Thus, the present
statute produces the same legal result in stock-for-assets purchases
and in cash-for-assets purchases.
(2) Claims Against the Officers, Directors,
and Shareholders
The second division of the proposed section 105 is designed to
provide officers, directors, and shareholders with maximum cer-
tainty about their liabilities following dissolution of their corpora-
185. Tail insurance often is available in directors' and officers' liability coverage poli-
cies. Typically, if coverage under such a policy is terminated for various specified reasons,
the individual director or officer is entitled to continue his coverage in effect for a few more
years. This enables an officer or director who ceases to act in his corporate capacity to carry
insurance covering claims that arise after he leaves his corporate position. Although similar
coverage apparently is unavailable to insure former directors, officers, and shareholders of a
transferor corporation against claims that would have been brought against that corporation
directly had it not dissolved and liquidated, such coverage potentially could be negotiated
with a corporation's liability insurance carrier either by a far-sighted transferor corporation
or by a transferee corporation under a contractual obligation to provide the coverage. See
generally Johnson & Stern, Significant Provisions in a Professional Liability Policy, in
PROFEssIONAL LLBLrY INsURANCE FOR LAWYERS AND AccouNTrrs HANDBOOK 9-55 (1976);




tion. The second division sets forth a general rule that all remedies,
claims, and causes of action abate if no action is commenced there-
on within two years after final dissolution. Any claim, remedy, or
cause of action against any officer, director, or shareholder is abated
if it has any connection with the corporate business or the winding-
up of the corporation. This includes any act, omission, or breach of
duty whether committed within or outside the scope of the defen-
dant's duties, or whether characterized as within the defendant's
capacity as an officer, director, or shareholder or characterized as
against the defendant individually. Remedies, claims, and causes of
action, however, that are truly by or against the defendant as an
individual, who just incidentally happens to be an officer, director,
or shareholder, do not abate. Causes of action against officers, direc-
tors, and shareholders that do not abate include actions for breach
of contracts upon which the defendant is personally liable in his
individual capacity and actions for torts personally committed by
the defendant that had no direct connection with the defendant's
position with the corporation. For example, an action for negligence
arising when the defendant caused an accident while driving a com-
pany car on official business would not abate, nor would an action
arising when the defendant personally left a foreign object in the
body of a patient while acting as a physician employed by the hospi-
tal corporation for which the defendant also happens to be an offi-
cer, director, or shareholder.
Those actions that abate include breaches of contracts that the
defendant signed in his capacity as an officer, director, or share-
holder only, and actions for torts committed by the defendant in the
interest of the corporation, or against the interest of the corporation
and in his personal interest but accomplished through his position
with the corporation. These latter actions might include an action
for actual or constructive fraud in concealing the assets of the corpo-
ration, an action against the defendant for inducing the corporation
to breach a contract, an action against the defendant for fraudu-
lently dissuading the claimants from filing suit in a timely manner,
and an action for breach of fiduciary duty by failing to pay certain
claimants, creditors, or shareholders.
The abatement occurs two years after the date of dissolution.
This gives claimants with actions against officers, directors, and
shareholders based upon acts, omissions, or breaches of duty two
years to act upon their claims. Thus, officers and directors would
need tail insurance covering directors and officers liabilities for only
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a two-year period following dissolution."6 After expiration of the
two-year continuation, most liabilities of officers and directors that
arose as a result of their having been connected with the dissolved
corporation will end. Certain specific exceptions to the general rule
of abatement are listed. Subdivision (a) excepts from abatement
those causes of action created by the first division of section 105 in
an effort to strike a compromise between certainty and definiteness,
on the one hand, and protection of creditors, claimants, and share-
holders with claims against those officers, directors, or shareholders,
on the other.
Subdivisions (b) and (c) are designed to extend the actionabil-
ity of a remedy, claim, or cause of action that arises because the
two-step dissolution mechanism for protecting creditors, claimants,
and shareholders has failed or has been subverted. Section 48(c) of
the Model Act creates liability for directors of a corporation that
fails to satisfy any known obligation or liability. Among the known
liabilities are those arising from suits pending on the date of final
dissolution. Section 48(c) therefore makes directors liable to credi-
tors and claimants who the corporation represented it had satisfied
prior to final dissolution and as a condition of final dissolution pur-
suant to section 92 of the Model Act. Section 92 also requires that
the corporation represent that shareholders have received in distri-
bution those assets remaining after satisfaction or provision for sat-
isfaction of the creditors and claimants with pending legal actions.
Subdivision (c) excepts from termination any remedy, claim, or
cause of action that a shareholder might have against an officer or
director if the officer or shareholder neglects that shareholder in the
liquidation and dissolution of the corporation. Subdivision (c) ap-
plies if the shareholder receives no notice prior to final dissolution
and if the shareholder receives no liquidating distribution either in
person or through the agency of the state treasurer under section 104
of the Model Act.8 7 Thus, the shareholders protected by subdivision
(c) are those who clearly went unprotected by the proper mechanism
for that protection, section 92.188 If the shareholder receives notice
of either the intent to dissolve or the final dissolution, he must guard
his own interests in the dissolving corporation. Subdivision (c) does
not protect this shareholder, who must remedy any wrongs commit-
ted against him within the two-year period. The only time limits on
186. See note 185 supra.
187. MODEL ACr, supra note 6, § 104.
188. Subdivision (c) is designed to resolve the problem that led the Seventh Circuit to
create the broadest exceptions to application of the survival statute and its bar. See text
accompanying notes 146-51 supra.
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the bringing of remedies, claims, and causes of action pursuant to
subdivisions (b) and (c) are the limits imposed by applicable stat-
utes of limitations.
(3) General Exceptions
The third division of the proposed section 105 creates certain
super-exceptions to application of the section. Courts recognized
that certain remedies, claims, and causes of action did not fit com-
fortably within the framework of the survival statute and its bar. '89
The drafters thought those remedies, claims, and causes of action
were outside section 105 and what they intended it to accomplish.
Subdivision (a) contemplates remedies, claims, and causes of action
following dissolution against property that has been distributed.
Subdivisions (b) and (c) contemplate legal actions and proceedings
that will be initiated or defended by the interested shareholders or
by a liquidating trustee in a representative capacity. Thus, in none
of the three subdivisions should there be any need to join the corpo-
ration as a named party.
Subdivision (a) permits foreclosure proceedings against real
property to enforce any security interest, lien, mortgage, or other
encumbrance entitled to such relief. Courts carved out this excep-
tion to abatement in cases brought under the survival statute. Al-
though subdivision (a) does not authorize actions for deficiency
judgments, foreclosure certainly should be maintainable whenever
default occurs, regardless of dissolution or expiration of any survival
period or continuation period. The same is true of actions to secure
rights in personal property; thus subdivision (a) expressly excludes
remedies, claims, and causes of action relating directly to interests
in the personal property itself, as opposed to causes of action for
deficiency judgments and other relief directed not against the prop-
erty but against the defaulting debtor.
Courts have been reluctant to limit access to courts for the
purpose of removing clouds on title to real property. 9 ' Clouds on
title that arise while a corporation is holding property may go unno-
ticed until years later. Similarly, a corporation may decide not to
clarify a cloud on title prior to dissolution. A corporation should be
allowed to pass clouded property to its shareholders who can then
clarify title. This would avoid lengthy litigation prolonging the cor-
poration's winding-up period and delaying final dissolution. Subdi-
vision (b) recognizes the passage of title to the shareholders upon
189. See notes 84 & 156 supra and accompanying text.
190. See text accompanying notes 154-57 supra.
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dissolution-shareholders should be as unhampered by dissolution
as would any other transferee. Thus, subdivision (b) excepts from
termination actions to clarify title-and extends this exception to
personal property as well as to real property.
Subdivision (c) allows the collection of corporate judgments no
matter how long that collection process may last, thus facilitating
winding-up and early final dissolution. Executions and garnish-
ments are among the remedies that are authorized, and creditor's
bills are typical actions that might be brought by shareholders or a
liquidating trustee.
In general, the proposed section 105 is intended to be a compre-
hensive statute governing all post-dissolution legal actions and pro-
ceedings against dissolved corporations, their officers, directors, and
shareholders. Whenever there is doubt about the applicability or
construction of section 105, doubt should be resolved in favor of the
exclusiveness of section 105 and in favor of termination of any rem-
edy, claim, or cause of action not expressly excepted from termina-
tion.
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